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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Jean E. Falconer
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2018
Title: Essays in Fiscal Policy
The subject of this dissertation is fiscal policy in the United States. In
recent years the limitations of monetary policy have become more evident,
generating greater interest in the use of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. Despite
considerable advances in the fiscal policy literature, many important questions
about the effects and implementation of such policy remain unresolved. This
motivates the present work, which explores both topics in the chapters that follow.
I begin in the second chapter by estimating Federal Reserve responses to
changes in taxes and spending. Monetary responses are a critical determinant of
fiscal policy effectiveness since central banks have the ability to offset many of
the economic changes resulting from fiscal shocks. Using techniques commonly
employed in the fiscal multiplier literature, my results indicate a willingness by
monetary policymakers to alter policy directly in response to fiscal shocks in a way
that either reinforces or counteracts the resulting effects.
In the third and fourth chapters I shift my focus to the conduct of fiscal
policy. Specifically, I use Bayesian methods to estimate the response of federal
discretionary policy to different macroeconomic variables. I allow for uncertainty
about various characteristics of the underlying model which enables me to
iv
determine, for example, which variables matter to policymakers; whether policy
conduct has changed over time; and whether policy responses are state dependent.
My results indicate, among other things, that policy responds countercyclically to
changes in the labor market, but only during periods of weak economic activity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For many years, empirical work on fiscal policy lagged far behind similar
work on monetary policy. However, the creation of the Eurozone in the 1990s
removed members’ access to independent monetary policy while the zero lower
bound episode that began in the United States in December of 2008 highlighted the
limits of such policy. As a result, fiscal policy has received a great deal of attention
in recent academic work.
The dominant theme of my dissertation is fiscal policy in the United States.
In Chapter II I focus on Federal Reserve responses to fiscal policy, which I see
as being a critical determinant of fiscal policy effectiveness. I then shift my
focus directly to the conduct of fiscal policy. In Chapter III I examine which
variables U.S. federal policy responds to as well as the sign and magnitude of
policy responses. Chapter IV extends Chapter III by focusing on the possible state
dependence of policy responses.
I begin in Chapter II by studying central bank responses to fiscal policy,
investigating whether the Federal Reserve alters the federal funds rate directly in
response to changes in taxes and spending. Surprisingly, interactions between fiscal
and monetary policy have received little attention in empirical work. I estimate
direct monetary policy responses to fiscal policy by identifying tax and spending
shocks from a structural VAR and calculating two sets of impulse responses, one
representing the actual federal funds rate response to fiscal policy shocks and the
other representing the same response when the Federal Reserve is prevented from
responding directly to fiscal policy. The difference between the two sets of impulse
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responses is the direct response. A nonzero direct response indicates that the Fed
responds differently to changes in the macroeconomy when the source of those
changes is fiscal policy.
My results suggest that the Federal Reserve responds directly to fiscal shocks,
and that its response depends on the type of shock. Specifically, the FOMC
reinforces the anticipated effects of spending shocks, for example decreasing the
federal funds rate in response to expansionary spending shocks. In contrast, the
Federal Reserve impedes tax shocks, for example increasing the federal funds
rate in response to expansionary tax shocks. The direct monetary response
to expansionary shocks is larger and more persistent than the response to
contractionary shocks, as is the response to local spending relative to federal
spending. My results also indicate that the direct response to tax shocks has
declined in recent years while the response to spending is largely unchanged.
In Chapter III I focus on the conduct of federal discretionary fiscal policy and
its response to the business cycle. Unlike monetary offset, there is an established
literature on this topic. Nonetheless, findings vary widely, with different studies
concluding that policy is procyclical, countercyclical, and acyclical, even within
similar sets of countries and time periods. These conflicting results may be due
in part to uncertainty about which covariates belong in the true model of fiscal
policy conduct. I approach the subject of fiscal policy cyclicality from a Bayesian
perspective, incorporating model uncertainty through the use of Bayesian model
averaging (BMA). BMA proceeds by averaging estimates across a large number of
models, weighting results from each according to how well the corresponding model
fits the data. As a result, estimates are robust to a large number of specifications.
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My results suggest a number of things about federal discretionary policy.
First, policymakers are much more likely to respond to the change in the
unemployment rate than output-based measures like the output gap. This is a
striking result given that, to my knowledge, I am the first to consider employment-
based measures in a cyclicality model. Second, overall policy is countercyclical,
although countercyclical policy is limited to recessions; during expansions,
in contrast, policymakers are unlikely to respond to economic conditions.
Distinguishing between taxes and spending makes it clear that both are changed
in response to the business cycle, although the magnitude of the tax response is
larger than the magnitude of the spending response. Finally, I find no evidence of a
structural break in business cycle responses, nor of substantive differences between
intended policy and actual policy outcomes.
Finally, Chapter IV is motivated by the observation that the sign
and magnitude of federal policy responses may differ depending on certain
macroeconomic characteristics like the business cycle phase or level of debt. There
is some evidence to suggest that this is the case. However, previous findings of
state dependence in fiscal policy conduct rely on strong assumptions about the
structure of the underlying model. I use Bayesian model comparison techniques
to compare linear and threshold models that differ with respect to the included
covariates and, for threshold models, the threshold variable and value that govern
regime switching. I consider twenty-nine possible threshold variables related to
the business cycle, debt, monetary policy, inflation, and political environment. My
results provide strong evidence that discretionary fiscal policy is regime dependent.
Among the threshold variables that I consider, the change in nonfarm payrolls
and the change in the federal funds rate are the most probable. Threshold value
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posteriors for both of these threshold variables split observations into regimes
consistent with periods of “normal” and “bad” economic performance that roughly
coincide with recession dates. As in Chapter III, coefficient estimates indicate that
policy is more countercyclical during the “bad” regime than during the “normal”
regime.
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CHAPTER II
DIRECT MONETARY RESPONSES TO FISCAL SHOCKS
1. Introduction
When central banks have the ability to change their policy interest rates,
the scope for fiscal policy as a stabilization tool may be limited since the effects of
such policy could be offset. That is, a tax or spending shock that causes inflation
and output to deviate from their target levels may prompt the central bank to
counteract these effects through changes in its policy interest rate, as long as it
is capable of doing so. In December of 2008, the federal funds rate hit the zero
lower bound, limiting not only the Federal Reserve’s ability to stabilize the U.S.
economy, but also its ability to offset changes in fiscal policy. The greater potential
for nonzero fiscal multipliers coupled with the passage of stimulus packages like the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act led to greater interest in fiscal policy by
academics and policymakers. Since then, research on fiscal policy has continued in
earnest, although the macroeconomic effects of such policy are still hotly debated in
the literature.
Despite greater interest in the use of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool,
interactions between fiscal and monetary policy have received little attention in
empirical work even though the effects of fiscal policy depend critically on how
the central bank responds. This knowledge gap motivates the present paper,
which considers Federal Reserve responses to fiscal policy in the United States.
Specifically, I estimate direct responses of the federal funds rate to tax and
spending shocks.
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I define an indirect response as the change in the federal funds rate in
response to the anticipated effects of a fiscal shock. The direct response, then, is
defined as any additional response to the shock itself. A nonzero direct response
indicates that the Fed responds differently to changes in the macroeconomy when
the source of those changes is fiscal policy. The sign of the direct response indicates
whether the Fed reinforces or impedes fiscal policy. Monetary policy will be said
to reinforce fiscal policy if the direct response to an expansionary fiscal shock
is expansionary and will be said to impede fiscal policy if the direct response
is contractionary. In other words, if the federal funds rate rises by less (or falls
by more) than is justified by the effects of an expansionary fiscal shock on the
macroeconomy, monetary policy will be said to reinforce that fiscal shock.
Consider direct and indirect monetary responses in the context of a simple
Taylor rule:
ffrt = a0 + a1(pi
e
t − pi∗) + a2(yet − y∗t ) + a3τt + a4gt + ut
where ffrt is the federal funds rate in period t, pi
e
t and y
e
t are forecasted inflation
and output in period t, pi∗ is the central bank’s inflation target, y∗t is potential
output, and τt and gt are taxes and spending. The indirect response to a fiscal
shock is captured by a1 and a2: a shock to spending or taxes affects the inflation
and output gaps, which then cause the federal funds rate to change. A direct
response is represented by a3 and a4.
I use a vector autoregression (VAR) to estimate direct monetary responses
to spending and tax shocks, which are calculated as the difference between two
impulse responses. The first represents the actual evolution of the federal funds
rate following a fiscal shock, while the other represents how it would evolve if
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it could respond only to the effects of the shock and not the shock itself. The
inclusion of Greenbook forecasts in the VAR is critical because they represent the
FOMC’s information set. Controlling for these forecasts, any direct response of the
federal funds rate can be interpreted as a response different from what the FOMC
itself believes is justified by the forecasted effects of fiscal policy on the economy.
My results suggest that the Federal Reserve responds directly to fiscal shocks,
and that its response depends on the type of shock. Specifically, it reinforces
the anticipated effects of a spending shock but impedes the anticipated effects
of a tax shock. I also find evidence of other asymmetries. The direct response
to expansionary shocks is much larger and more persistent than the response to
contractionary shocks, which disappear after about three years. The same is true of
local spending shocks relative to federal spending shocks, but there is not a similar
distinction between defense and nondefense shocks. Since the Great Moderation
the direct response to tax shocks may have become smaller, but the response to
spending shocks does not appear to have changed much.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes related
literature while Sections 3 and 4 discuss methodology and data. Section 5 presents
results from the main specification before discussing robustness checks and
asymmetry in responses to the subcomponents of the tax and spending variables.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Until recently, empirical work on fiscal policy focused almost exclusively
on output responses to fiscal shocks. Consequently the available evidence on
central bank reactions to fiscal policy is relatively scarce and far from conclusive.
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Monetary policy, when mentioned, is typically offered as a possible explanation of
results rather than being of primary interest in and of itself. Indeed, many of the
papers discussed below do not include the central bank policy interest rate in their
analysis, which is arguably a better indicator of policy stance than other short-term
interest rates. Consensus on the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy is
further complicated by the proliferation of government spending and tax variables,
which in some cases differ greatly from each other.
Despite these complications, there is some evidence to suggest that the
Federal Reserve does not always try to offset fiscal policy. Romer and Romer
(2016) provide anecdotal evidence that, at least in the past, this was the case.
Excerpts from FOMC minutes over the period 1951-1992 suggest that policymakers
were well aware of changes in taxes and Social Security benefits, and that they
had traditional views on their probable economic effects. Nevertheless, in some
instances Federal Reserve staff expressed a desire to refrain from or delay in
responding to tax changes. The decision to offset policy changes depended
on whether the aggregate demand effects of the policy were intentional or
unintentional. For example, in February 1964 one member made the comment
that “the stimulative effect of a tax cut, which was being counted on so heavily
by the American people should not be offset by the System until such action was
obviously necessary” (Minutes, 2/11/64, p. 48). Romer and Romer (2016) present
other similar statements in their paper. In contrast, policymakers felt the need
to counteract Social Security benefit increases immediately to prevent them from
having unintended expansionary effects on the economy.
Early empirical work on central bank responses to fiscal policy comes from
Muscatelli, Tirelli, and Trecroci (2002). Their focus, whether monetary and fiscal
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policy offset or accommodate each other’s shocks, is similar to that of the present
paper. The authors find that the federal funds rate decreases following a fiscal
expansion, accommodative behavior that is in line with the narrative evidence
presented above. This relationship holds both before and after 1979, a notable date
in U.S. monetary history.
Although suggestive, the authors do not distinguish between direct and
indirect federal funds rate responses, making it impossible to determine whether
the federal funds rate falls due to the macroeconomic effects of an expansionary
shock or due to the shock itself. Furthermore, the use of total budget deficits as
the fiscal policy variable prevents one from distinguishing between automatic and
discretionary fiscal policy. Finally, the authors do not distinguish between taxes
and government spending, which is standard in more recent work.
Romer and Romer (2016) compare the macroeconomic effects of a narrative
tax series they created with permanent increases in Social Security benefits.
Following a tax cut, they observe a small (but significant) negative response of the
nominal federal funds rate, which persists for about twelve quarters. Perotti (2004)
obtains similar results for both nominal and real long-term interest rates, although
these responses represent the average response across five OECD countries. Taken
together, these results again indicate a willingness of central banks to lower the
federal funds rate in support of expansionary fiscal policy.
In contrast, Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) find that central bank
policy rates decline in response to tax increases. Since they use a linear model, this
implies an increase following a tax cut and thus offsetting behavior. However, their
results may not be directly comparable to those of Romer and Romer (2016) and
Perotti (2004) since their data includes only contractionary changes in fiscal policy.
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Additionally, their data covers seventeen OECD countries, many of which have not
had independent central banks for some time.
As with taxes, the evidence on central bank responses to government
spending is mixed. Some authors have found evidence of accommodative behavior
by the Federal Reserve. In Ramey (2011), short-term nominal interest rates
decrease following a positive shock to a defense news variable that measures
the expected discounted value of changes in defense spending. Similarly, Perotti
(2014) distinguishes between U.S. civilian and defense spending shocks and finds a
negative interest rate response to a positive shock to either of these variables.
These results are consistent with an accommodative Federal Reserve although
they should be met with caution. Ramey’s defense variable has been criticized for
having very little explanatory power when applied to data that excludes World War
II and the Korean War, periods when things like patriotism, rationing, and price
controls may have complicated the relationship between macroeconomic variables
(Perotti, 2011). Indeed, Ramey herself suggests that the behavior of interest rates
in her set-up may be driven by wartime central bank policies.
Perotti’s earlier work using a single government spending variable and
data from five OECD countries contradicts his 2014 findings (Perotti, 2004). In
that paper, long-term nominal and real interest rate responses suggest offsetting
behavior by central banks, increasing in response to a positive spending shock.
Canova and Pappa (2011) observe a similar interest rate response in the U.S.,
although this response is not remotely significant. Nonetheless, these findings are
more in line with the traditional assumption that central banks counteract the
expansionary effects of government spending increases.
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The extent to which the Federal Reserve offsets changes in fiscal policy may
depend on the means by which policy changes. Perotti (2004) and Guajardo,
Leigh, and Pescatori (2014) both consider asymmetric responses to spending and
taxes, although their results differ, possibly due to the fact that the latter only
consider contractionary policy changes. Perotti (2004) finds evidence of offsetting
behavior following expansionary spending shocks but not expansionary tax shocks.
Specifically, the real interest rate response is positive four and twelve quarters after
a spending increase but negative after a tax cut. Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori
(2014) detect offsetting behavior in response to a contractionary shock of either
kind, although central bank policy rates fall more in response to spending-based
shocks than tax-based shocks.
Perotti (2014) looks at asymmetric responses by the Federal Reserve to
civilian and defense spending. His results indicate a negative response of short-
term interest rates to a spending increase of either kind, but this negative response
persists only for defense shocks. For a civilian spending shock, the interest rate
becomes positive after about ten quarters. Perotti does not provide an explanation
for his results, although his findings suggest that the Federal Reserve is less likely
to offset spending related to military activity.
Romer and Romer (2016) find a difference in how the Federal Reserve
responds to Social Security benefit increases relative to tax changes. They show
that the federal funds rate increases dramatically following a Social Security benefit
increase but falls slightly after a tax cut, despite the fact that both are predicted
to have positive output effects. This fits with FOMC excerpts that suggest that
members felt it prudent to respond immediately to changes in Social Security but
not taxes.
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Finally, Belinga and Ngouana (2015) find evidence that Federal Reserve
responses to spending shocks are regime-dependent. In their set-up, the
two regimes are “accommodative” and “non-accommodative” monetary
policy, determined by deviations from an estimated policy reaction function.
Unsurprisingly, they conclude that in response to a positive spending shock the
federal funds rate declines in the accommodative regime but increases in the non-
accommodative regime. This indicates that there may be times when the Federal
Reserve wishes to counteract spending shocks and times when it does not.
In sum, whether, when, and to what extent the Federal Reserve offsets
fiscal shocks is far from clear. Importantly, none of the papers discussed above
distinguishes between direct and indirect responses to fiscal shocks, making it
impossible to determine whether the federal funds rate response is driven solely by
the economic consequences of a shock or if there is a direct response to the shock.
However, there is sufficient anecdotal and empirical evidence to suggest that the
subject warrants further investigation.
3. Methodology
As defined, a direct response to fiscal policy means that the Federal Reserve
responds to spending and tax shocks differently from what is warranted by the
predicted effects of such shocks on the economy. Consequently it can be thought of
as the difference between two impulse responses. The first, an unrestricted impulse
response, represents the actual evolution of the federal funds rate following a shock.
If fiscal shocks affect macroeconomic variables of interest to the Federal Reserve,
this impulse response does not allow us to determine whether the estimated
changes in the federal funds rate are due to changes in GDP and inflation caused
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by fiscal shocks or whether there is an additional response to the shocks themselves.
That is, the unrestricted impulse response is the sum of the direct and indirect
responses to fiscal policy.
The other impulse response, a restricted impulse response, shows the
progression of the federal funds rate when it is prevented from responding directly
to fiscal shocks. This counterfactual illustrates the indirect monetary response to
changes in spending and taxes that would occur if the Federal Reserve responded
solely to the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy. Once the restricted and
unrestricted impulse responses are obtained, the direct monetary response can be
calculated as the difference between the two.
The following section outlines the empirical strategy used to estimate the
restricted and unrestricted impulse responses. Since my interest centers on Federal
Reserve responses to fiscal policy (and not vice versa), the methods I use are
motivated by common approaches in the fiscal policy literature. Specifically, I
incorporate narrative tax shocks into a structural VAR identified from a recursive
causal ordering.
3.1 Standard Fiscal Variables and the Narrative Approach
Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) seminal paper on the macroeconomic effects
of fiscal policy established VARs as the paradigm for estimating the effects of
such policy. The tax and spending variables they use in that paper also became
the standard definitions used in subsequent fiscal policy research. However, in
recent years the availability of alternative measures has reduced reliance on these
potentially flawed variables. I will discuss each in turn.
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In Blanchard and Perotti (2002), government spending is defined as the sum
of state and federal government consumption expenditure and gross investment.
Government consumption expenditure consists of spending on public goods and
services like education and national defense, while gross investment consists of
spending on infrastructure like highways1. The primary concern about government
expenditure and gross investment is that it is anticipated (a concern that applies
equally to taxes). Since legislated changes in spending are often implemented with
a delay, economic agents may respond to the announcement of a spending shock
that precedes any real change in spending. In fact, if the present discounted value
of spending is the only thing that matters to economic agents (as is the case in the
neoclassical model), the timing of actual changes in spending should be irrelevant.
Ramey (2011) provides evidence that shocks to government expenditure and gross
investment are anticipated, finding that they are Granger-caused by professional
forecasts.
Taxes are commonly measured as tax revenues less transfer and interest
payments2. Since transfer and interest payments fluctuate with output, this
measure is often called cyclically-adjusted tax revenues, although such terminology
is misleading. Crucially, it does not account for the fact that changes in output
also affect the tax base and therefore tax revenues3. Nonetheless, it is argued that
once revenues are cyclically-adjusted, any further change should reflect changes in
discretionary tax policy.
1see http://www.bea.gov/national/ for more information.
2Transfer payments are counted as negative taxes rather than positive spending.
3To account for this, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use external information to calculate the
output elasticity of taxes, which they then impose as a restriction in their VAR. Caldara and
Kamps (2008) find that the estimated output responses to taxes depend enormously on this
elasticity, which is why I use a different approach.
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The narrative approach developed largely in response to the concern that the
traditional tax variable does not accurately reflect discretionary policy. It relies on
using historical documents to construct measures of taxes and spending. Romer
and Romer’s (2010) tax series and Ramey’s (2011) spending series are the primary
series used in the fiscal literature, although others (Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori
(2014), for example) have created similar series for other OECD countries.
Romer and Romer (2010) use historical documents to create a tax variable
that measures legislated changes in tax liabilities, thus ensuring that it reflects
actual changes in policy. The series is also constructed to be orthogonal to changes
in GDP and other factors that “push growth away from normal.” Specifically,
they define a tax change as exogenous if the stated motivation for the change is
higher long-run growth or to reduce an inherited budget deficit. They argue that
these types of tax changes are exogenous because they are unlikely to be related to
current or future economic conditions.
Romer and Romer did not consider possible anticipation effects in
creating their tax series which, as mentioned, may yield incorrect results if
responses to fiscal policy begin at the announcement of the policy rather than its
implementation date. Mertens and Ravn (2012) find evidence of anticipation effects
using Romer and Romer’s tax measure. They note that excluding tax changes
whose legislation and implementation did not occur within the same quarter
reduces the estimated effects of tax changes on GDP by a considerable amount.
Ramey’s (2011) defense news variable is constructed in a similar manner to
the Romer and Romer series. It measures the present discounted value of changes
in government spending motivated by military concerns. Importantly, it does not
15
reflect the timing of actual changes in spending but rather announcements of such
spending.
There are a number of arguments against the use of Ramey’s defense news
variable. As she herself discusses in her paper, the variable does a poor job of
predicting actual changes in defense spending when World War II and the Korean
War are excluded from the sample. Similarly, as suggested by Perotti (2014), it is
unclear what a shock to a news variable even represents. Finally, Perotti (2014)
demonstrates that two VARs with and without the defense news variable that are
otherwise identical produce nearly identical results4. This suggests that although
anticipatory effects may be problematic in theory, they do not appear to matter
much in practice.
For estimation, I use Mertens and Ravn’s version of Romer and Romer’s tax
series since my results change depending on which version is used, possibly because
of anticipation effects. However, due to the objections raised above I do not use
Ramey’s defense news variable as my primary spending variable. Instead, I use
the more common government expenditure and gross investment. Augmenting my
baseline VAR with Ramey’s defense news variable has no effect on the results. To
estimate possible asymmetric responses to different types of fiscal shocks, I also
divide taxes and spending into their subcomponents.
4Ramey (2011) estimated very different results using the same setup, but that was because
she was not comparing the same shock for each. Rather, she estimated the effects of an actual
spending shock in one VAR and the effects of a defense news shock in the other.
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3.2 The VAR Approach
The reduced-form VAR can be written as
Yt = α + pi(L)Yt−1 + ut
where Yt, α, and ut are m-dimensional vectors of endogenous variables, constants,
and reduced-form residuals, and pi(L) is a lag polynomial. The included variables
are first-differenced since a Dickey-Fuller test indicates that spending has a unit
root. I include eight lags because the errors are autocorrelated when I use fewer.
Since the reduced-form VAR residuals are likely correlated with each other,
they do not have an economic interpretation. However, we can write down a
structural VAR whose errors can be given such an interpretation:
AYt = µ+ φ(L)Yt−1 + t
Matrix A describes the contemporaneous relationships between the included
endogenous variables while µ = Aα and φ(L) = Api(L). Written in this way,
the relationship between reduced-form residuals ut and structural shocks t can be
expressed as
ut = A
−1t
The contemporaneous effect of structural shocks is determined by matrix A
while their propagation is determined by the VAR reduced-form coefficients.
Consequently identification of the system hinges on identifying the elements of A.
Assuming that the structural shocks are uncorrelated with each other and scaling
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them to have unit variance (which makes variance-covariance matrix Σ the identity
matrix), it is easy to see that
Σu = QQ
′
where Q = A−1. This provides some identification restrictions but without further
restrictions the model remains unidentified.
A number of different identification schemes have been proposed in the
literature, including a recursive causal ordering of the variables, the use of external
information to estimate specific parameters of A (this is the approach taken by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002)), restrictions on the signs of impulse responses,
partial identification of matrix A, and the use of narrative shocks that are
constructed to be exogenous. I combine a recursive causal ordering with the use
of narrative shocks.
A recursive causal ordering restricts matrix A to be lower-triangular, which
implies assumptions about contemporaneous relationships between variables.
Specifically, variables ordered higher in the system do not respond to variables
ordered below them within a period. Once these restrictions are imposed, a unique
matrix A can be obtained from a Cholesky decomposition of Σu.
In the main specification I order the variables as follows: taxes, government
spending, GDP forecast, inflation forecast, and the federal funds rate5. This
ordering implies that the tax variable does not respond contemporaneously to
any other variable, and that government spending responds only to taxes within
5Although I include current values of GDP and inflation as a robustness check, I exclude them
from the baseline specification since lags of forecasts should control for them. My results are
largely unchanged when they are included.
18
a quarter. Ordering the fiscal variables at the top can be justified on the grounds
that the tax series is constructed to be independent of other macroeconomic
variables, while the legislative process is such that discretionary changes in
government spending in response to economic conditions are implemented with
a lag. The ordering of the other variables assumes that forecasts and the federal
funds rate respond to fiscal policy contemporaneously but that forecasts do not
respond contemporaneously to the federal funds rate. As explained in the following
section, the federal funds rate data was constructed with this restriction in mind.
It turns out that variable order matters little for my results, which are virtually
identical as long as spending and taxes are ordered first in the system (with either
taxes or spending as the first variable) and qualitatively the same when these
variables are ordered last.
To construct the unrestricted impulse responses, I use impact matrix A and
the reduced-form VAR coefficients pi(L) to simulate the effects of a one-standard
deviation structural shock on the endogenous variables in the system. I construct
the restricted impulse responses in a similar manner but prevent monetary policy
from responding directly to fiscal policy by setting the relevant elements of A and
pi(L) equal to zero. For example, in the baseline model elements (5,1) and (5,2)
of matrix A measure the contemporaneous response of the federal funds rate to
tax and spending shocks, while the same elements in each pi(L) determine how the
federal funds rate responds to taxes and spending after the initial shock. Setting
these elements equal to zero prior to simulating the effects of a shock removes the
direct monetary response from the impulse response.
The use of forecasts is important to identifying a direct response to fiscal
policy since delays in the effects of monetary policy mean that the Federal Reserve
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responds to both current and future economic conditions. Even more important,
however, is the use of Greenbook forecasts. Since these forecasts are produced by
Federal Reserve staff for the FOMC, they reflect policymakers’ information about
the probable effects of fiscal policy on the economy. Consequently a nonzero direct
response estimated using Greenbook forecasts suggests that the FOMC knowingly
responds directly to a fiscal shock. The use of alternative forecasts of GDP and
inflation may yield similar but inaccurate conclusions. In that case, two possibilities
may explain a nonzero direct response. First, the FOMC may correctly forecast the
effects of a fiscal shock and deliberately respond differently than what is warranted
by the shock. However, it could also be that the FOMC’s information set is
different from the information contained in the alternative forecasts. Consequently
even if its goal is to merely offset the effects of a shock, it will appear to respond
directly to it. The use of Greenbook forecasts reduces the likelihood of this second
possibility6.
4. Data
For most specifications I use quarterly data covering 1967q1-2007q4, although
when forecasts are excluded I extend the sample to 1955q1 as a robustness check.
Government spending, GDP, and the GDP deflator come from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis NIPA tables, while the civilian noninstitutional population
data used to transform variables comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
modified Romer and Romer tax series was obtained from Karel Mertens’s website7
6Even using Greenbook forecasts, a nonzero direct response may be the result of offsetting
behavior by policymakers whose beliefs differ from Greenbook forecasts rather than a deliberate
direct response to a shock. This is one of the possible explanations for a direct response offered in
the introduction.
7https://mertens.economics.cornell.edu/research.htm
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while the federal funds rate comes from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Finally, Greenbook forecasts come from the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia.
The sample dates were determined primarily by data availability8 but they
have a number of other advantages. First, they exclude notable episodes like World
War II and the Korean War when massive increases in defense spending coincided
with unusual circumstances (such as rationing and Federal Reserve regulations
that discouraged the purchase of durable goods) that may obscure the “typical”
relationship between macroeconomic variables 9. Additionally, the sample excludes
the Great Recession when the federal funds rate was at the zero lower bound, which
forced the Federal Reserve to resort to unconventional monetary policy. Although
the Federal Reserve response to fiscal policy during zero lower bound episodes is
in itself an interesting area of research, including these years could, again, make it
difficult to assess the typical monetary response to fiscal policy.
The variables are defined as follows: government spending is the sum of state
and local defense and nondefense government consumption expenditure and gross
investment. As discussed, this definition is common in the fiscal policy literature.
Taxes are defined as the estimated revenue effects of legislated tax changes at
the time of their implementation. GDP is used to forecast output and the GDP
deflator is used for the inflation forecast. The quarterly federal funds rate was
created from monthly data to ensure that it can respond to forecasts within a
quarter, as implied by its ordering in the VAR. Specifically, it is the nominal federal
8Greenbook forecasts for GDP and inflation are available from 1967 onward while the Romer
tax series is available until the end of 2007.
9See Ramey (2011) and Perotti (2011 and 2014) for further discussion.
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funds rate in the month following the Greenbook publication closest to the middle
of a given quarter10.
As mentioned, all variables enter the VAR in first differences. This is done
because the spending variable appears to have a unit root, and because the Romer
and Romer tax variable is defined as the change in taxes rather than its level.
Spending is expressed as the logged first difference of real per capita spending.
The GDP forecast is expressed as a growth rate and inflation is the logged first
difference of the GDP deflator. The federal funds rate is the first difference of the
nominal rate, while the tax variable is expressed in nominal terms as a percentage
of nominal GDP.
5. Results
This section presents the direct response of the level of the federal funds rate
(in basis points) to a one-standard deviation fiscal policy shock. With one noted
exception, I consider only expansionary shocks (spending increases and tax cuts)
to facilitate comparison between shock types and specifications. Remember that
direct responses do not show how the federal funds rate actually changes following
a shock but rather the difference between how it changes and how it would change
if it could not respond directly to fiscal policy.
5.1 Baseline Model
The results from the baseline model, displayed in Figure 1, indicate nonzero
direct responses to spending and taxes. They also suggest a difference in how the
10This is similar to the approach taken by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) to obtain
quarterly Greenbook forecasts.
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FIGURE 1. Direct Responses to Expansionary Spending and Tax Shocks
Notes: Responses are for the level of the federal funds rate and are expressed in basis
points. The direct response is estimated using the baseline model.
Federal Reserve responds to each type of shock. An expansionary spending shock
results in a negative direct response while a similar tax shock leads to a positive
response. The peak response to spending (taxes) is about -40 (46) basis points and
occurs after fourteen (twelve) quarters. The effects persist indefinitely, stabilizing
at -27 (23) basis points after about twenty quarters. Note that the linear nature
of the VAR implies a positive direct response to a contractionary spending shock
and a negative direct response to a contractionary tax shock. Taken together,
these results imply that the Federal Reserve reinforces the anticipated effects
of spending, easing policy more than necessary in response to an expansionary
shock and tightening following a contractionary shock. Conversely, it moves in
opposition to the anticipated effects of taxes, lowering the federal funds rate more
(or increasing it by less) than warranted by changes in macroeconomic variables
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following a contractionary tax shock and increasing it (or lowering it by less) after
an expansionary shock.
5.2 Robustness
To check the robustness of the results above I estimate a number of variations
of the baseline model. For some specifications I add current values of GDP and
inflation alongside their forecasted values to see whether their exclusion from the
baseline model really is innocuous. I also include current and forecasted values
of the unemployment rate since there is some evidence that the Federal Reserve
considers unemployment when making policy decisions (Check, 2016). In another
specification I use only contemporaneous values of the variables in the baseline
model and in yet another I use two-quarter ahead forecasts instead of one-quarter
ahead. I also investigate whether accounting for the anticipation of spending shocks
or failing to account for the anticipation of tax shocks affects results. To do so I
augment the baseline VAR with Ramey’s defense news variable in one specification
and use the entire Romer and Romer tax series in another.
The results from the baseline model are quite robust to changes in
specification. Table 1 summarizes these results. In nearly every case the estimated
direct responses are qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar, particularly
the responses to spending shocks. Notably, the direct response to a tax cut changes
sign when the entire Romer and Romer tax series is used. The estimated response
to spending in the VAR with Ramey’s defense news variable is the largest of any
specification but yields the same conclusions as the baseline model. Thus it appears
that accounting for anticipated changes in fiscal policy is critical for taxes but less
important for spending.
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TABLE 1. Peak and Long-Run Direct Responses from Different Specifications
Spending Taxes
Peak Long-run Peak Long-run
(1) -40 -27 46 23
(2) -38 -30 37 18
(3) -34 -20 48 26
(4) -45 -27 52 27
(5) -37 -20 58 38
(6) -34 -19 57 36
(7) -52 -36 47 28
(8) -44 -25 -24 -9
Notes: Responses are for the level of the federal funds rate and are expressed in basis
points. (1) is the baseline model; (2) uses two-quarter ahead forecasts instead of one-
quarter ahead; (3) uses contemporaneous values of GDP and inflation instead of forecasts;
(4) augments the baseline model with the one-quarter ahead unemployment forecast;
(5) includes both current and forecasted values of GDP and inflation; (6) includes both
forecasted and current values of GDP, inflation, and unemployment; (7) augments the
baseline model with Ramey’s defense news variable; (8) uses Romer and Romer’s entire
tax series instead of just those legislated and implemented within the same quarter.
5.3 Asymmetry
Positive and Negative Shocks
The baseline model does not allow for asymmetric responses to positive
and negative fiscal shocks. Yet if Federal Reserve policymakers believe that
expansionary and contractionary shocks have different effects on the economy,
those beliefs may be reflected in policy. For instance, Guajardo, Leigh, and
Pescatori’s (2014) finding that central bank policy rates decline more following a
contractionary spending shock than a contractionary tax shock could be explained
by differences in direct policy responses. However, their setup does not allow one to
distinguish between direct and indirect monetary responses, making it impossible to
determine whether asymmetries reflect intentional actions by the Federal Reserve
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or rather differences in the macroeconomic effects of tax and spending shocks that
feed back into the interest rate response.
To allow for this possibility, I create separate variables for positive and
negative tax and spending shocks and include them all in the baseline VAR. I set
the positive tax shock equal to the tax shock when the shock is greater than zero
and set the negative tax shock equal to the tax shock when it is less than zero. I
use the same strategy for changes in government spending and shock each of the
variables to produce the results above. Instead of considering only expansionary
shocks, I present results for the same type of shock as the variable considered (i.e.
I consider a positive shock to the positive tax variable and a negative shock to the
negative tax variable) for ease of interpretation.
Figure 2 displays the results, which show a clear difference in how the Federal
Reserve responds to expansionary fiscal shocks relative to contractionary fiscal
shocks. By and large, direct responses to expansionary shocks are much larger in
magnitude than responses to contractionary shocks, which approach zero after
about three years. In contrast, the direct response to expansionary shocks lasts
indefinitely. The timing of the responses also differs between the shock types. The
direct responses to expansionary shocks are close to zero for the first year while the
largest responses to contractionary shocks occur during that time. Finally, unlike
the responses to expansionary shocks, the responses to contractionary shocks switch
signs after about a year before converging towards zero. The earlier observation
that the Federal Reserve reinforces the effects of a spending shock but impedes the
effects of a tax shock holds here as well.
26
FIGURE 2. Direct Responses to Expansionary and Contractionary Fiscal Shocks
Notes: Responses are for the level of the federal funds rate and are expressed in basis
points. The graph on the left illustrates the direct response to expansionary shocks
(positive spending and negative taxes) while the graph on the right illustrates the direct
response to contractionary shocks (negative spending and positive taxes).
Different Types of Spending
The government spending variable in the baseline model is comprised of state,
local and federal spending, while federal spending is itself the sum of defense and
nondefense spending. It is possible that different types of spending shocks prompt
different Federal Reserve responses. For instance, Perotti’s (2014) finding that
defense spending is contractionary while nondefense spending is expansionary
may be explained by asymmetric monetary responses. To see whether the type
of spending matters for the monetary response I estimate two variations of the
baseline model, one in which local and federal spending appear as two different
variables and another that separates defense and nondefense spending in a similar
manner.
The results, shown in Figure 3, indicate distinct direct responses to local and
federal spending but not defense and nondefense spending. The direct responses to
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FIGURE 3. Direct Responses to Different Types of Spending Shocks
Notes: Responses are for the level of the federal funds rate and are expressed in basis
points. The graph on the left illustrates the direct response to expansionary local and
federal spending shocks while the graph on the right illustrates the direct response to
expansionary defense and nondefense spending shocks.
local and federal spending are nearly identical for two years but then diverge. The
response to local spending is permanent, settling around -37 basis points, while the
response to federal spending returns to zero after nine quarters. Direct responses to
defense and nondefense spending, in contrast, largely move together, following the
same trajectory as federal spending (which makes sense given that federal spending
is the sum of defense and nondefense spending). Thus it seems as though monetary
policymakers reinforce the effects of local spending more than federal spending and
do not distinguish between defense and nondefense spending.
Motivation Behind Tax Change
Romer and Romer (2010) classify the motivation behind each tax shock,
making it possible to separately estimate direct responses to tax changes motivated
by a desire to increase long-run growth and those motivated by a desire to reduce
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an inherited budget deficit. Figure 4 shows the results of this exercise. The direct
monetary response to both kinds of tax shocks are positive, again indicating a
direct response that opposes the predicted effects of an expansionary tax shock.
However, the direct response to taxes intended to increase long-run growth is for
the most part greater than the response to shocks intended to reduce inherited
budget deficits. It is worth noting that the mean of the long-run tax shocks is
negative while the mean of the deficit shocks is positive. I showed earlier that
direct responses to negative tax shocks are larger than responses to positive shocks,
so it could be the average signs of the shocks driving the results rather than their
motivation.
5.4 Subsample Stability
To see whether the direct monetary response to fiscal policy changed following
the Great Moderation, I estimated the baseline specification starting in 1984q1. As
Figure 5 indicates, the direct responses to either type of expansionary fiscal shock is
roughly zero in the year following the shock. After that, the response to each shock
is identical in sign to the full sample, although the tax response is smaller and only
temporary, approaching zero after four years. Interestingly, the direct response
to spending is similar in magnitude to the baseline VAR and persists indefinitely.
These results suggest that the FOMC has moderated its response to taxes in more
recent years but continues to reinforce the anticipated effects of an expansionary
spending shock, after a delay.
Greenbook forecasts for inflation and GDP are unavailable prior to 1967 so I
am unable to estimate the baseline model over an extended sample as a robustness
check. However, I estimated the baseline model using contemporaneous values of
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FIGURE 4. Direct Responses to Different Types of Tax Shocks
Notes: Responses are for the level of the federal funds rate and are expressed in basis
points. The solid line illustrates the direct response to a tax cut motivated by a desire to
reduce an inherited budget deficit while the dashed line illustrates the direct response to
a tax cut motivated by a desire to increase long-run growth.
FIGURE 5. Direct Responses After 1983
Notes: Responses are for the level of the federal funds rate and are expressed in basis
points. Estimated responses to expansionary spending and tax shocks after 1983. The
direct response is estimated using the baseline model and a sample that covers 1984q1-
2007q4.
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inflation and GDP on the baseline sample as well as an extended sample that goes
back to 1955q1. I also removed Paul Volcker’s first term as Federal Reserve chair
from my baseline sample to see whether my results are driven by unusual monetary
policy during that time. As Figure 6 demonstrates, the results from both of these
samples are qualitatively similar to those from the baseline specification, albeit
smaller in magnitude. Thus it appears my results are robust to changes in sample
years.
6. Conclusion
This paper examines whether the Federal Reserve responds directly to fiscal
shocks. Using a VAR framework, I estimate the difference between the actual
federal funds rate impulse response following a fiscal shock and a counterfactual
response in which the central bank is unable to respond directly to fiscal shocks.
The inclusion of Greenbook forecasts is critical because they represent the FOMC’s
information set. Controlling for these forecasts, any direct response of the federal
funds rate can be interpreted as a response different from what the FOMC itself
believes is justified by the forecasted effects of fiscal policy on the economy.
I estimate a nonzero direct monetary response to fiscal policy, the
direction and magnitude of which appears to depend on the type of fiscal shock.
Expansionary (contractionary) spending shocks are accompanied by expansionary
(contractionary) direct monetary responses, but the converse is true of tax shocks.
In other words, the anticipated effects of spending shocks are reinforced while the
anticipated effects of taxes are impeded. The estimated direct responses are robust
to a number of variations in the baseline model.
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FIGURE 6. Direct Responses Estimated Using Different Subsamples
Notes: Responses are for the level of the federal funds rate and are expressed in basis
points. Estimated direct response of the federal funds rate to expansionary spending and
tax shocks using different samples. The graph on the left illustrates the direct response
from a model that uses only contemporaneous values of inflation and GDP as well as an
extended sample (1955q1-2007q4). The graph on the right illustrates the direct response
from the baseline sample (1955q1-2007q4) when Paul Volcker’s first term as Federal
Reserve chair is removed.
Further asymmetry can be seen when the baseline variables are disaggregated.
Direct responses to expansionary shocks are larger and more persistent than
responses to contractionary shocks, indicating that the Federal Reserve offsets
the latter but not the former. The direct response to federal spending is small and
short-lived while the response to local spending is negative and permanent. The
FOMC does not appear to distinguish between defense spending and nondefense
spending. There may be some differences in how the Federal Reserve responds to
tax changes passed to increase long-run growth relative to changes made to reduce
an inherited budget deficit, although this difference could be due to the sign of the
shocks rather than their motivation. Finally, it appears that in recent years the
direct monetary response to taxes has declined in magnitude and duration while
the response to spending is largely unchanged (but delayed).
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Any explanation of these results is speculative but there are a number of
possibilities:
1. Direct monetary responses are unintentional. The FOMC may
want to offset all shocks but fail to do so. This could occur if the divine
coincidence does not hold or if certain types of shocks are prioritized over
others. Similarly, the FOMC may pay greater attention to some shocks than
to others.
2. Direct monetary responses are intentional. The FOMC may, as
suggested by Romer and Romer (2016), be aware of all fiscal shocks and
their predicted effects on the economy but choose not to offset them, either
because they wish to support the policies of the legislative branch or because
of political motivations.
3. FOMC beliefs are not fully captured by Greenbook forecasts. Under
this scenario, it is impossible to determine whether direct responses are
intentional or unintentional.
If direct responses are intentional, an interesting question is whether the
decision to offset fiscal shocks depends on the initial state of the economy. For
example, the FOMC may choose to offset an expansionary spending shock when
output is above potential but not when it is below potential. If shock types depend
on the state of the economy, asymmetric responses to these shocks may be driven
by the state of the economy rather than the shock type itself. This could, for
example, explain why direct responses to expansionary shocks are larger and more
persistent than direct responses to contractionary shocks. Future research is needed
to determine which explanations are most plausible.
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Another interesting question is how Federal Reserve independence influences
the sign and magnitude of direct monetary policy responses. One would expect
a less independent Fed to engage in more accommodative policy at the behest of
politicians interested in winning reelection. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence
to suggest that the FOMC occasionally succumbed to political pressure to lower
the federal funds rate during the 1960s and 1970s.11 To use the terminology
introduced previously, one might expect the direct responses implemented by a
less independent Fed to be lower (more expansionary) than the direct responses
implemented by a more independent Fed.
It is difficult to determine whether Federal Reserve independence, which
varied considerably over the course of my 40-year sample, helps explain the results
obtained in this paper. Results using the post-1983 subsample indicate that the
magnitude of the direct response to spending shocks is much smaller (and less
expansionary) in the year following a shock than when results are estimated
from the entire sample. Given that Fed independence increased after the 1970s,
this is consistent with the idea presented above that direct responses should be
smaller and less expansionary when the central bank enjoys greater independence.
However, my finding that monetary policy impedes tax shocks is counterintuitive,
especially since the direct response to tax shocks is smaller in magnitude (and more
expansionary) using the post-1983 subsample. More work is needed to determine
whether Federal Reserve independence influences the response of monetary policy
to fiscal policy. For example, the estimation of time-varying coefficients (and
therefore time-varying direct responses) could reveal differences in policy responses
11See “Federal Reserve Independence: The Never-Ending Story” by Mark Thoma at
http://www.milkenreview.org/articles/federal-reserve-independence?IssueID=26.
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corresponding to periods in which the Fed was more independent and periods in
which it was less independent.
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CHAPTER III
CYCLICALITY OF U.S. FISCAL POLICY
1. Introduction
Despite some well-known instances of countercyclical discretionary fiscal
policy by the United States government, it is far from clear whether such
policy is systematic. For instance, the onset of the Great Recession in late 2007
motivated the passage of two stimulus packages, the Economic Stimulus Act and
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which were clearly designed to
counteract the large decline in output that had occurred. However, even as the
economy experienced a tepid recovery and unemployment remained well above the
natural rate, political focus shifted towards debt stabilization and a perceived need
for fiscal austerity. In January 2013, with unemployment close to 8%, Congress
passed the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) as a partial resolution to the
U.S. fiscal cliff. ATRA led to a large increase in tax revenues, projected by the
CBO to total 1.5 trillion dollars over the next five years.1 Two months later,
automatic cuts to discretionary spending went into effect as a result of the Budget
Control Act of 2011.
Empirical work on fiscal policy has largely failed to yield a consensus on
whether and how discretionary policy responds to the business cycle. Different
studies have concluded that policy is procyclical, countercyclical, and acyclical,
even across similar sets of countries and time periods.2 Several papers have
1See “Estimates of the Budgetary Effects of H.R. 8, the American Taxpayer Relief Act, as
passed by the Senate on January 1, 2013” at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-
congress-2011-2012/costestimate/american-taxpayer-relief-act0.pdf
2Table 1 in Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) provides a good summary of conflicting results.
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investigated the source of these discrepancies, emphasizing the importance of data
vintages and accounting for potentially autocorrelated errors.3 Far less attention
has been paid to covariate selection. Unlike the monetary policy literature, in
which policy is typically modeled as following a Taylor rule, there appears to be
little agreement about how to model the conduct of discretionary fiscal policy.
As a result, models can differ substantially from paper to paper. All include some
measure of output, but even then there are differences in the specific measure used
as well as the time period in which it enters the model.
Table 2 provides a summary of covariates used in some well-known papers
in the literature. It suggests that there is considerable uncertainty about the
underlying model of fiscal policy conduct. It should be noted that, with the
exception of Auerbach (2002 and 2003) and Cohen and Follette (2003), the
literature has focused primarily on European fiscal policy. As a result, drawing
conclusions about U.S. policy from these papers can be problematic. However,
it seems likely that uncertainty about the correct model of fiscal policy extends
to U.S. policy as well, particularly since it is less well-studied. Indeed, I find a
number of instances in which failing to account for model uncertainty leads to
flawed inferences about policy conduct.
Although counterintuitive, acyclical or procyclical policy may occur for
a number of reasons. First, policymakers may think it unnecessary to respond
to output if they believe the combined responses of monetary policy and non-
discretionary fiscal policy can stabilize output without additional aid. Divisions
between political parties may also make it difficult to pass legislation unless the
situation is urgent, such as during a recession. In either case, we might expect
3See, again, Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) as well as Plodt and Reicher (2015).
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discretionary responses to be limited to particularly severe economic events or
times in which other types of policy are ineffective (for example, at the zero lower
bound). Another possibility is that policymakers have other goals they see as
being more important than and incompatible with countercyclical policy. For
example, policymakers may care more about reducing government debt than
stabilizing output. As the U.S. experience in 2013 demonstrates, concerns about
fiscal responsibility can result in contractionary policy even during times of weak
economic growth.
Finally, acyclical or procyclical policy could be unintentional. Legislation
takes time to implement, which may cause changes in policy to occur later in the
business cycle than intended. For example, spending increases in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, passed in early 2009, peaked in the first quarter
of 2010, six months after the official end of the Great Recession. Similarly, policy
decisions may be based on faulty information. Revisions to output and employment
variables can be substantial, which may cause large differences between intended
policy and actual policy outcomes.4 This issue has been studied in the literature,
with many studies concluding that intended policy tends to be more countercyclical
than actual policy.5
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether and how federal
discretionary fiscal policy responds to the business cycle in the United States.
Motivated by discrepancies in the existing literature, I approach the issue of
model uncertainty from a Bayesian perspective, treating the set of covariates in
the underlying model as an additional parameter to be estimated. Using Bayesian
4See Orphanides and van Norden (2002) and Aruoba (2008) for more about the magnitude of
data revisions.
5See, for example, Forni and Momigliano (2004), Golinelli and Momigliano (2009), and Egert
(2010).
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techniques I calculate posterior probabilities for each of a large set of models, where
each model is defined by the included covariates. These posterior probabilities
indicate the probability that a particular model is the underlying model that
generated the data. I then average coefficient posteriors across the entire set of
models using posterior model probabilities as weights. This procedure, known
as Bayesian model averaging (BMA), produces results that are not conditioned
on any particular model and that, because they are weighted by posterior model
probabilities, reflect uncertainty about the underlying model. It also produces
inclusion probabilities that, in the current context, enable me to determine
which variables matter to policymakers. In other words, BMA provides a formal
statistical framework that explicitly accounts for the type of model uncertainty that
appears to be widespread in this literature.
The set of covariates that I consider contains six measures of the business
cycle as well as other control variables common in the literature. My inclusion of
employment-based measures of the business cycle, the unemployment gap and the
change in the unemployment rate, is novel. The number of models that I estimate
is substantial, 216 = 65,536 for my initial results and 233 = 8,589,934,592 when I
consider asymmetric responses to expansions and recessions. The computational
requirements of estimating such a large number of models necessitates the use of
Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques developed by Madigan and York (1995).
My results suggest that federal discretionary policy in the United States is
countercyclical: the portion of the deficit determined by discretionary policy actions
increases in response to poor economic conditions. This response appears to be
driven primarily by changes in taxes, although I find some evidence that spending
exhibits a similar, albeit smaller, response. Distinguishing between expansions and
recessions makes it clear that countercyclical responses are limited to recessions.
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Indeed, during expansions policy has a very low estimated probability of responding
to business cycle measures in either direction. Posterior probabilities indicate
that policy is much more likely to respond to employment-based measures of
the business cycle than output-based measures, particularly the change in the
unemployment rate. This is a striking result given the ubiquity of output-based
measures elsewhere in the literature. Also notable is my finding that policy is
unlikely to respond to the level of publicly-held debt. A comparison of my results
with those obtained from more traditional fiscal policy models suggests that the
importance of debt may be overstated in models that do not account for model
uncertainty.
In contrast with Auerbach (2002 and 2003) and Cohen and Follette (2003),
I find little evidence of a shift in the responsiveness of policy to the business
cycle during the course of my fifty-year sample. The posterior probability that a
structural break occurred in my model coefficients is just .48%. Finally, and again
in contrast with Cohen and Follette (2003), replacing ex post data with real-time
data reveals that intended responses to the business cycle are very similar to the
responses that actually occur. In the latter instance BMA proves to be useful in
identifying the source of these different findings.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses traditional
models of fiscal policy conduct and the implementation of Bayesian model
averaging. Section 3 discusses data and Section 4 presents my results. Section 5
concludes.
41
2. Methodology
2.1 Traditional Models of Discretionary Policy Conduct
Models of discretionary fiscal policy conduct usually take the form
CADt = α + β1CADt−1 + β2outputt + β3debtt−1 + β4Zt + et (3.1)
where CADt is the so-called cyclically-adjusted deficit, output is usually the output
gap or GDP growth, and Zt represents other possible control variables.
The cyclically-adjusted deficit measures what the deficit would be if the
economy were at full employment and is constructed to eliminate the effects of
automatic stabilizers on the deficit.6 As a result, it should reflect discretionary
fiscal policy actions. I use cyclically-adjusted net federal government savings as my
measure of the cyclically-adjusted deficit.7 This measure, published quarterly by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), is a translation of the U.S. federal budget
into National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) terms and therefore differs
slightly from federal deficits and surpluses.8 It has been used previously to study
discretionary policy in the United States and is similar to measures constructed
by the OECD and IMF to study European policy.9 For simplicity I will refer to
6Automatic stabilizers are defined as automatic changes in government revenues and
expenditures that occur in response to the business cycle.
7For ease of interpretation, I reversed the sign of this variable so that a positive value indicates
a deficit and a negative value indicates a surplus.
8Differences result from coverage adjustments (certain transactions are included in one
framework but not the other), timing differences (some transactions are recorded on an accrual
basis in the NIPAs but a cash basis in the federal budget), and differences in the categorization of
transactions (some transactions count as negative taxes in one framework and positive spending in
another). For more information see “NIPA Translation of the Fiscal Year 2017 Federal Budget” at
https://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2016/04%20April/0416 nipa translation of the 2017 federal budget.pdf.
9See Auerbach (2002,2003) and Cohen and Follette (2003) for its use to study U.S. policy and
Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) for a list of papers that use it to study European policy.
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cyclically-adjusted net federal government savings as the cyclically-adjusted deficit
for the remainder of the paper.
Equation (1) implies that discretionary fiscal policy responds to output
within a period. Since most of the cyclicality literature uses annual data, this
is a plausible assumption. However, since I use quarterly data the possibility of
policy lags is much more likely. It is well-known that fiscal policy is prone to a
number of lags that may prevent it from responding immediately to economic
conditions. For example, noisy data may prevent policymakers from recognizing
that policy is needed, and the sometimes contentious nature of the policymaking
process may delay responses even once the need to respond is established. Indeed,
the assumption that discretionary policy does not respond to output within a
quarter is used by much of the fiscal multiplier literature to identify fiscal shocks.10
As a result, I make the same assumption in this paper, using the first lag of each
business cycle measure in each model I estimate.
I use three different measures of the output gap, real GDP growth, the
unemployment gap, and the change in the unemployment rate as business cycle
measures. Control variables are similar to those found elsewhere in the literature.
They include publicly-held debt, the federal funds rate, inflation, political dummy
variables, three lags of the dependent variable, and a time trend. These variables
are discussed in further detail in section 3.
2.2 Bayesian Model Averaging
I consider j=1, . . . , J linear regression models in which the cyclically-adjusted
deficit is regressed on an intercept and a subset kj of K possible explanatory
10See Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), among others.
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variables. Formally, I estimate
CAD =αιT +Xjβj +  (3.2)
where CAD is a T × 1 vector holding observations of the cyclically-adjusted deficit,
ιT is a T × 1 vector of ones, Xj ∈ X is a T × kj matrix containing the regressors in
model j, and  is assumed to be N(0T ,h
−1 IT ). I assume that uncertainty about the
underlying model of fiscal policy conduct extends only to which covariates belong
in the model. As a result, each model is defined by the included regressors, Xj. As
suggested in Fernandez, Ley and Steel (2001b), each of the variables in X is de-
meaned to ensure that the intercept, α, has the same interpretation in each model.
The Bayesian approach to model comparison involves the estimation of
posterior model probabilities, which indicate the probability that a given model
is the true model. The posterior model probability for model Mj is calculated as
Pr(Mj|Y ) = p(Y |Mj) Pr(Mj)∑J
i=1 p(Y |Mi) Pr(Mi)
(3.3)
where Pr(Mj) is the prior for model j and p(Y |Mj) is the marginal likelihood.
The marginal likelihood is the expected value of the likelihood function where the
expectation is taken with respect to the prior for the model’s parameters. It can be
interpreted as the average fit of a particular model over the prior parameter values.
Once posterior model probabilities are estimated, posterior distributions
for objects of interest (e.g. slope coefficients) can be obtained. One option is to
focus on results from the model with the highest posterior probability. However,
this approach is problematic if there are multiple plausible models that produce
different or even conflicting results. Another option is to average results across all
possible models using posterior model probabilities as weights. This procedure is
44
known as Bayesian model averaging (BMA). Using BMA, the posterior distribution
for some object of interest, λ, is calculated as
p(λ|Y ) =
J∑
j=1
p(λ|Y,Mj) Pr(Mj|Y ) (3.4)
BMA is beneficial for a number of reasons. First, estimates incorporate
results from many possible models which, as mentioned above, reduces the
likelihood that inferences are driven by model choice. In fact, as equation (4)
makes clear, estimates are not conditioned on any particular model. Additionally,
BMA estimates reflect uncertainty about the underlying model since results
from each model are weighted by the associated posterior model probability.
Estimates based on a single model, in contrast, are calculated under the potentially
implausible assumption that the model they come from has a 100% posterior
probability. Finally, BMA generates inclusion probabilities that indicate the
likelihood that a particular variable belongs in the underlying model. In the current
context, inclusion probabilities are useful in determining which variables matter to
policymakers.
When the total number of models is small, BMA can be implemented using
the following steps:
1. Calculate posterior statistics (e.g. coefficient posterior means) for all models.
2. Calculate posterior model probabilities, as in equation (3). When models are
given equal prior odds, Pr(Mj) and Pr(Mi) drop out of the equation.
3. Average posterior statistics using posterior model probabilities as weights, as
in equation (4).
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In practice, implementing steps 1-3 above is computationally burdensome and
potentially infeasible when the number of possible models is large. In that case,
one can sample from the model space using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model
Composition (MC3) algorithm of Madigan and York (1995). MC3 produces random
draws from a Markov chain whose stationary distribution is the distribution defined
by the posterior model probabilities.
Starting with an initial model, Ms−1, MC3 proceeds in the following steps:
1. Propose a new model, M∗. This can be done using a symmetric proposal
distribution that adds or deletes a single variable from the previous model.
The use of a symmetric proposal distribution simplifies the acceptance
probability in step 2.
2. Calculate the acceptance probability as
α(M s−1,M∗) = min
[
p(Y |M∗) Pr(M∗)
p(Y |M s−1) Pr(M s−1) , 1
]
(3.5)
With equal prior model odds, (5) simplifies to the ratio of marginal
likelihoods for each model.
3. Accept M∗ as the new draw, M s, with probability α and reject it with
probability (1− α). If M∗ is rejected, the algorithm remains at Ms−1, in which
case Ms =Ms−1
4. Calculate posterior statistics of interest for M s.
5. Return to step 1 and repeat until convergence.
Once a sufficient number of draws are obtained, Pr(Mj|Y ) can be calculated as the
fraction of total draws for which model Mj is selected.
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Intuitively, MC3 identifies a subset of models with relatively high posterior
probability, which reduces the number of models under consideration. At each
iteration a model is proposed and accepted based on how well it fits the data (as
measured by its marginal likelihood). Consequently models with good explanatory
power are drawn more frequently than those with poor explanatory power. In fact,
models with very low posterior probability may not be drawn at all, in which case
their estimated posterior probability will be zero. Since these models have such
low posterior probability this approximation should have a negligible effect on
estimated posterior probabilities for drawn models.
I implement BMA using MC3 since doing so analytically would take a great
deal of time at current computing speeds. For example, suppose a single model
can be estimated in one-hundredth of a second. At that rate, estimating my
largest specification, for which the total number of models is 233 = 8,589,934,592,
would take nearly 500 days to complete. However, as a robustness check I also
calculated analytical results for my non-asymmetry model, for which the total
number of models is a more manageable 216 = 65,536. The analytical results are
virtually identical to those obtained using MC3, suggesting that my use of MC3 is
appropriate.
When I use MC3, I assume that 250,000 draws are sufficient for the Markov
chain to converge and use an additional 1,000,000 draws for inference. I also
checked for convergence in a number of ways. First, I increased the number of
burn-in draws to 1,000,000, which had no discernible effect on my results. Next,
I initialized MC3 using two very different models, one with no covariates and one
with every possible covariate. Again, my results were unaffected by the initial
model. Finally, I calculated posterior model probabilities analytically for the
subset of models visited by the algorithm (posterior probabilities were set to 0
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for models that were not drawn) and compared them with posterior probabilities
obtained using MC3 for the same set of models. The correlation between analytical
and numerical results for visited models is greater than 0.99, as recommended in
Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b).
2.3 Priors
To implement BMA, prior density functions are required for all models and
their parameters. I assume that each possible covariate enters the true model
independently of all other covariates with probability θ, suggesting a model prior
of the form
Pr(Mj) = θ
kj(1− θ)K−kj (3.6)
Setting θ = 0.5, a common choice in the BMA literature, implies equal prior
probability across all possible models, so that
Pr(Mj) =
1
J
, j = 1, · · · , J (3.7)
Although (7) places equal prior weight on all models, the same is not true of model
size. Instead, models with few or many regressors receive lower prior probability
than models of moderate size. This is evident by noting that equation (6) implies a
prior distribution for model size, W, of the form
W ∼ Binomial(K, θ) (3.8)
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This distribution is centered on Kθ, so the use of a uniform model prior (θ = 0.5)
means that models with K
2
variables receive the most prior probability while those
with 1 or K variables receive the least.
As an alternative to (7), Ley and Steel (2009) suggest using a hierarchical
prior, making θ random instead of fixing it at a particular value. Specifically,
θ ∼ Beta(a, b) (3.9)
Ley and Steel recommend setting hyperparameter a = 1 and using a prior mean
model size, m = a
a+b
K, to elicit hyperparameter b. Setting b = 1 results in a
uniform prior for model size,
Pr(W = w) =
1
K + 1
for w = 0, · · · , K (3.10)
while setting b > 1 places greater prior probability on smaller models than larger
models. Once the prior for model size is obtained, the model prior is calculated as
Pr(Mj) =
Γ(a+ b)
Γ(a)Γ(b)
Γ(a+ kj)Γ(b+K − kj)
Γ(a+ b+K)
(3.11)
For my main results I use (11) and set b = 1, although I demonstrate that these
results are robust to the use of alternative model priors.
Turning to model parameters, I require a prior density function,
p(α, βj, h|Mj), for each set of parameters. I use the “benchmark” prior
recommended in Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b) for use when, as in the current
paper, there is uncertainty about the covariates in a normal linear regression model.
The prior involves the use of improper non-informative priors for parameters that
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appear in all models (α and h) and informative priors for those that do not (βj).
Specifically,
p(h) ∝ h−1 (3.12)
p(α) ∝ 1 (3.13)
βj|h ∼ N(βj, h−1(gX ′jXj)−1) (3.14)
where (gX ′jXj)
−1 is the g-prior of Zellner (1986). I set β
j
= 0kj and g =
1/max{T,K2}, again as recommended in Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b).
This prior is useful because it limits the choice of hyperparameters to one, g,
which is chosen in an automatic fashion. In addition to requiring little subjective
information from the researcher, the authors find that it has little influence on
posterior inference. Finally, it reduces the computational burden of implementing
MC3 since analytical results are available for p(βj|Y ) and Pr(Mj|Y ).
3. Data
I use quarterly data covering the period 1966q1-2016q3. Table 3 lists the
source of each of the data series used to construct my final variables. I use three
different measures of the output gap. One measure comes from the CBO and I
estimate the other two myself. The first (which I call the trend break output gap)
is estimated using a linear time trend and a break in the trend after 1973 to allow
for a slowdown in GDP growth.11 The other is estimated using the filter proposed
in Hamilton (2017).12
11See Orphanides and van Norden (2002) for further explanation.
12The Hamilton filter is an alternative to the HP filter discussed in Hamilton (2017).
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TABLE 3. Data Sources
Variable Source
Cyclically-adjusted net
federal government savings
BEA (via CBO)
Real GDP FRED
Real Output Gap CBO (via FRED)
Nominal Potential GDP CBO (via FRED)
Unemployment Rate FRED
Natural Rate of Unemployment FRED
Publicly-Held Federal Debt FRED
Federal Funds Rate FRED
CPI FRED
GDP Deflator FRED
Presidential Election Dummy The American Presidency Project
United Government Dummy The American Presidency Project
Recession Dummy NBER
Notes: BEA is the Bureau of Economic Analysis, CBO is the Congressional Budget
Office, FRED is the Federal Reserve Economic Database, and NBER is the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
The cyclically-adjusted deficit and debt are expressed as percentages of
potential GDP, as measured by the CBO.13 An augmented Dickey-Fuller test
indicates that the cyclically-adjusted deficit is stationary so I include it and its
lags in levels.14 Both inflation variables are calculated as quarterly growth in the
corresponding price indices and annualized. Real GDP growth is also calculated
as quarterly growth and annualized. Finally, the “presidential election” dummy
variable takes on a value of one in all quarters during an election year while the
“united government” dummy variable takes on a value of one for quarters in which
13Results are unchanged when these variables are expressed as percentages of the other two
potential output measures that I estimate.
14First-differencing the cyclically-adjusted deficit changes the estimated coefficients on the
policy lags but otherwise has no effect on results.
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the White House, Senate, and House of Representatives were all controlled by the
same political party.
4. Results
4.1 Baseline Results
Inclusion probabilities, presented in Table 4, make it clear that discretionary
policy responds to the business cycle: the posterior probability that at least one
of the business cycle measures belongs in the underlying model of fiscal policy
is 99.8%. Among the business cycle measures, the change in the unemployment
rate receives far greater posterior probability, 99.1%, than any of the others. This
result is striking since, to my knowledge, I am the first in this literature to consider
employment-based measures of the business cycle. In contrast, GDP growth and
the output gap, the measures most commonly employed in the literature, together
receive just 22.7% posterior probability. Lastly, the unemployment gap receives
6.5% posterior probability, suggesting that policymakers care more about the
direction of the unemployment rate than its level. This means, for example, that
discretionary policy is less likely to respond to a high and stable unemployment
rate than to a low unemployment rate that is increasing. The contraction in policy
that occurred in 2013, when the unemployment rate remained elevated even after
three years of steady decreases, is consistent with this finding.
Among the other variables, only the first two policy lags receive posterior
probabilities greater than 50%. The high posterior probabilities received by the first
and second lag, 100% and 94.8%, respectively, indicate that discretionary policy is
persistent. Considering that most fiscal policy actions are determined as part of the
budget negotiation process, this finding is intuitive. It seems likely that the starting
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TABLE 4. BMA Inclusion Probabilities
Variable Probability
CA Deficit First Lag 100%
CA Deficit Second Lag 94.8%
CA Deficit Third Lag 3.5%
Time Trend 3.3%
Output Gap (CBO) 10.4%
Output Gap (TB) 4.9%
Output Gap (Hamilton) 5.7%
GDP Growth 2.8%
Unemployment Gap 6.5%
Unemployment Change 99.1%
Debt 4.2%
Federal Funds Rate 4.8%
CPI Inflation 27.0%
GDP Deflator Inflation 6.6%
Presidential Election 3.6%
United Government 3.7%
Total Output Gap 19.9%
Total Inflation 29.3%
Notes: Results for variables with inclusion probabilities greater than 50% are bolded.
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point for each year’s budget is the budget from the previous year rather than a
blank slate.
Finally, it is worth noting that the inclusion probability for the level of debt
is just 4.2%. This is surprising given that Bohn (1998), Auerbach (2002 and 2003),
and Cohen and Follette (2003) all find that U.S. fiscal policy responds to debt.
Differences in findings may be driven in part by the use of a different dependent
variable, in the case of Bohn (1998), or the use of a different debt measure, in the
case of Auerbach (2002 and 2003) and Cohen and Follette (2003). However, they
may also be due to the fact that these authors consider a single model instead of
averaging results across many possible models as I do. As I demonstrate below, the
use of a single model can result in significant estimated responses to this variable.
Table 5 and Figure 7 present information about coefficient posterior
distributions, which measure short-run policy responses. Table 5 lists posterior
means averaged across all possible models using posterior model probabilities as
weights. For these results, I include values of zero that are assigned to coefficients
whose corresponding variables are excluded from some models. In contrast, Figure
7 presents histograms for coefficient posterior distributions conditional on inclusion
in the model. For these results I exclude values of zero for variables that do not
appear in some models. In Table 5, posterior means are expressed in a number of
different ways to ease interpretation. The first column lists posterior means as I
estimate them, as a percentage of potential output. The second column converts
the numbers in column one to billions of 2016q3 dollars to better convey their
magnitude. Finally, the third column expresses the numbers in column two as
a percentage of the 2016q3 cyclically-adjusted deficit to put these magnitudes in
context.
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TABLE 5. BMA Posterior Means
Variable
Posterior Mean
(% potential)
Posterior Mean
(dollars)
Posterior Mean
(% deficit)
Intercept 2.85 537 91.3
CA Deficit First Lag 0.68 128 21.8
CA Deficit Second Lag 0.25 48 8.1
CA Deficit Third Lag 0.00 0 0.1
Time Trend 0.00 0 0.0
Total Output Gap -0.01 -1 -0.2
GDP Growth 0.00 0 0.0
Unemployment Gap 0.00 1 0.1
Unemployment Change 0.60 112 19.1
Debt 0.00 0 0.0
Federal Funds Rate 0.00 0 0.0
Total Inflation -0.01 -1 -0.2
Presidential Election 0.00 1 0.1
United Government 0.00 1 0.1
Notes: Column 1 includes posterior means measured as a percentage of potential output.
Column 2 converts the numbers in column 1 to billions of 2016q3 dollars. Column 3
converts the numbers in column 2 to a percentage of the 2016q3 deficit.
FIGURE 7. Coefficient Posterior Distributions Conditional on Inclusion
Notes: For variables with inclusion probabilities less than 100% the large point mass at
zero is ignored. Results for the third policy lag are omitted.
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Together, Table 5 and Figure 7 indicate that discretionary policy is
countercyclical: the coefficient posterior mean for the change in the unemployment
rate is positive, conditional or unconditional on inclusion in the model. This
means that an acceleration in the unemployment rate leads to larger deficits. The
magnitude of this response is large. For example, assuming the unemployment rate
has been stable, a one percentage point increase in this variable is predicted to
increase the cyclically-adjusted deficit by about $111 billion dollars (using 2016q3
prices), which was nearly 19% of the total deficit in 2016q3.
It is informative to compare the results from my model with those that would
be obtained from a more traditional cyclicality model like equation (1). To that
end, Table 6 presents OLS estimates for individual models alongside my BMA
estimates. For the OLS estimates, each model includes a single cylical variable as
well as my non-cyclical covariates.15 Bolded coefficients indicate a p-value of less
than 0.1 (for columns 1-6) or an inclusion probability greater than 90% (for the
BMA column).
Table 6 demonstrates that the importance of debt and inflation may be
overstated in a single model that does not account for model uncertainty. This is
particularly evident in columns (2) and (4), where coefficients for these variables
have p-values of less than 0.1. I find, in contrast, that policymakers are unlikely to
respond to either variable: the inclusion probability for CPI inflation is 27% while
the inclusion probability for debt is just 4.2%. Similarly, the estimated responses
to these variables are often larger in magnitude when a single model is used since
BMA shrinks coefficients on variables with low estimated probability of being in the
model towards zero.
15I exclude GDP deflator inflation because I do not want to include two inflation variables in an
OLS regression and CPI inflation appears to explain the data better than GDP deflator inflation.
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TABLE 6. Results from BMA and OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) BMA
CA Deficit First Lag 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.74 0.70 0.64 0.68
CA Deficit Second Lag 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.25
CA Deficit Third Lag 0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.00
Time Trend 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Output Gap (CBO) -0.08 -0.01
Output Gap (TB) -0.04 0.00
Output Gap (Hamilton) -0.05 0.00
GDP Growth -0.05 0.00
Unemployment Gap 0.09 0.00
Unemployment Change 0.65 0.60
Debt 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Federal Funds Rate -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
CPI Inflation -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01
Presidential Election 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.00
United Government 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.00
Notes: Each of columns (1)-(6) lists OLS results from a single model, where each model
differs only by which business cycle measure it uses. The last column lists my BMA
results. Coefficients with p-values less than 0.1 or inclusion probabilities greater than 90%
are bolded.
In sum, my results indicate that discretionary policy in the United States
is countercyclical. I find little evidence to support the idea that policymakers
respond to output-based measures of the business cycle, an assumption made, to
my knowledge, by all of the existing literature. Instead, policy is far more likely
to respond to the change in the unemployment rate. Posterior probabilities also
indicate that policy is persistent and unlikely to respond to the other covariates
that I consider. Finally, accounting for model uncertainty greatly reduces the
estimated influence of debt and inflation on policy outcomes.
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4.2 Model Prior Robustness
The model prior employed in the previous section assigns equal prior
probability to different model sizes but unequal prior probability to individual
models. It is possible, then, that the results presented earlier are driven by the
choice of model prior. To address this possibility, I examine the sensitivity of my
results to the use of different model priors. Specifically, I consider a uniform prior
across all models, achieved by setting θ = 0.5 in equation (6), as well as a prior that
places greater probability on smaller models than larger models, achieved by setting
b > 1 in equation (11). In fact, when b > 1 the prior mode for model size is equal to
zero. I considered a range of values for b but only present results for b = 15.16
Table 7 lists inclusion probabilities and averaged coefficient posterior means
using three different priors: b = 1 (the original model prior), θ = 0.5, and b = 15.
Unsurprisingly, the average model size increases when greater prior probability is
placed on larger models, and decreases when greater prior probability is placed
on smaller models. This is due primarily to differences in inclusion probabilities
for variables that are considered unlikely under the initial model prior. Inclusion
probabilities for these variables are roughly twice as large when θ = 0.5 and
about half as large when b = 15. Since inclusion probabilities for these variables
are so small under the initial model prior, even large proportional changes have
little effect on overall conclusions. In contrast, inclusion probabilities are mostly
unchanged for variables with high inclusion probabilities under the initial model
prior. As a result, slope coefficient posterior means are also similar across model
priors. It appears, then, that the basic conclusions from the previous section hold
regardless of which model prior is used.
16Results for other values of b greater than 1 yield similar conclusions to when b is set to 15,
which I chose because it implies a prior mean model size of one.
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TABLE 7. Results for Alternate Model Priors
Variable
Probability
(b = 1)
Probability
(θ = 0.5)
Probability
(b = 15)
CA Deficit First Lag 0.68 0.66 0.70
(100%) (100%) (100%)
CA Deficit Second Lag 0.25 0.26 0.24
(94.8%) (98.0%) (88.6%)
Time Trend 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.3%) (9.9%) (1.2%)
Total Output Gap -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(19.9%) (38.2%) (10.7%)
GDP Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.8%) (6.3%) (1.5%)
Unemployment Gap 0.00 0.01 0.00
(6.55%) (13.0%) (3.3%)
Unemployment Change 0.60 0.60 0.58
(99.1%) (99.85%) (97.7%)
Debt 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.2%) (12.0%) (1.4%)
Federal Funds Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.8%) (11.2%) (2.2%)
Total Inflation -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(29.3%) (55.8%) (13.8%)
Presidential Election 0.00 0.01 0.00
(3.6%) (8.8%) (1.4%)
United Government 0.00 0.01 0.00
(3.7%) (9.55%) (1.4%)
Average Model Size 3.8 4.9 3.3
Notes: average model size excludes the constant that appears in every model. Coefficient
estimates are on the same line as the corresponding variable name while inclusion
probabilities are in parentheses. Variables with inclusion probabilities greater than 50%
are bolded.
4.3 Business Cycle Asymmetry
It is possible that policy responds differently to economic conditions in
expansions and recessions, for reasons outlined in the introduction. Cohen and
Follette (2003) consider asymmetric responses to the business cycle in the United
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States by estimating responses to positive and negative output gaps, which are
included as two separate variables in their model. They find that responses to
negative output gaps are significant and countercyclical while responses to positive
output gaps are not significant, suggesting that discretionary policy is more likely
to respond to poor economic conditions than to good economic conditions.17
I approach business cycle asymmetry in a slightly different manner. Instead
of using positive and negative values of my business cycle measures to measure
the strength of the economy, I use a lagged recession indicator that is equal to 1 if
the economy was in a recession the previous period.18 In contrast with Cohen and
Follette (2003), I also allow responses to all covariates to differ between expansions
and recessions instead of just the business cycle measures. To construct my
asymmetry specification I interact the constant and each covariate with the lagged
recession indicator, include the 17 interaction terms (which I call recessionary
variables) alongside the uninteracted variables (which I call expansionary variables),
and estimate the specification using BMA.
Table 8 presents inclusion probabilities and posterior means for the
asymmetry specification alongside my initial results. Together, they make it clear
that the discretionary response to business cycle measures estimated in the previous
section is driven by large responses to the change in the unemployment rate during
recessions. Inclusion probabilities for expansionary business cycle measures are
all less than 5%, even for the change in the unemployment rate. Correspondingly,
coefficient posterior means for these variables are small in magnitude although
17Because they define the output gap in the opposite way that I do, subtracting actual output
from potential output, they actually estimate a significant and countercyclical response to positive
output gaps, which they define as potential output exceeding actual output.
18Using a lagged recession indicator is consistent with my assumption that discretionary policy
does not respond to economic conditions within a quarter.
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TABLE 8. Asymmetry Specification Results
Variable Baseline Expansion Recession
CA Deficit First Lag 0.68 0.76 0.73
(100%) (100%) (15.1%)
CA Deficit Second Lag 0.25 0.17 0.15
94.8% (72.3%) (11.2%)
Total Output Gap -0.01 0.00 0.00
(19.9%) (1.9%) (2.3%)
GDP Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.8%) (0.5%) (0.6%)
Unemployment Gap 0.00 0.00 0.00
(6.5%) (0.6%) (0.7%)
Unemployment Change 0.60 0.00 1.16
(99.1%) (0.7%) (99.8%)
Debt 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.2%) (0.5%) (1.1%)
Federal Funds Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.8%) (1.1%) (6.8%)
Total Inflation -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(29.3%) (5.3%) (11.9%)
Presidential Election 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.6%) (0.7%) (0.5%)
United Government 0.00 0.00 0.00
(3.7%) (0.6%) (0.5%)
Notes: coefficient estimates are on the same line as the corresponding variable name
while inclusion probabilities are in parentheses. Results are bolded for variables with
inclusion probabilities greater than 50%. Results for the third deficit lag and time trend
are omitted.
conditional on inclusion all but GDP growth are indicative of countercyclical policy.
Thus it appears that during expansions policymakers feel little need to respond
to economic conditions. The only variables to receive posterior probabilities
greater than 5% are the first and second lags of the cyclically-adjusted deficit. The
posterior means for these variables are relatively large at 0.76 and 0.17, indicating a
great deal of persistence in policy.
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During recessions, in contrast, policymakers have a very high probability of
responding to the change in the unemployment rate. The inclusion probability for
this variable increases from 0.7% during an expansion to 99.8% during a recession
and its posterior mean, 1.16, is nearly twice as large as what I estimate for the
non-asymmetry specification. It implies that, assuming a previously constant
unemployment rate, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate
during a recession causes a countercyclical response equal to about 220 billion
dollars (in 2016q3 prices) or slightly less than 40% of the 2016q3 cyclically-adjusted
deficit. This estimate appears to be plausible. For example, the change in the
unemployment rate increased from 0.3% to 0.7% between 2008q3 and 2008q4
which, using my estimate, implies a 87.8 billion dollar increase in the cyclically-
adjusted deficit (in 2016q3 dollars). The following quarter, the cyclically-adjusted
deficit increased by 282 billion dollars.
4.4 Changes in Policy Over Time
A number of papers in the monetary policy literature have estimated changes
in policy conduct over time, concluding that the Federal Reserve has responded
more aggressively to changes in inflation since the mid-1980s.19 Similarly, changes
in political ideologies and priorities may have altered the conduct of fiscal policy
over the past fifty years. Auerbach (2002 and 2003) and Cohen and Follette (2003)
find evidence to support this, concluding that discretionary policy has responded
more strongly to the output gap since 1993, a date chosen to coincide with the
beginning of the Clinton administration. However, these authors do not test
whether the change in policy responsiveness is significant, instead basing their
conclusions on differences in coefficients estimated using different sample periods.
19See, for example, Taylor (1999b) and Stock and Watson (2002).
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I consider changes in policy by searching for evidence of a structural break in
the coefficients of my non-asymmetry specification, allowing for uncertainty across a
number of dimensions.20 Bayesian model comparison techniques outlined in section
2 can be used to compare “no break” models of the form
CADt = α +Xtβ + t (3.15)
with structural break models of the form
CADt = α +Xtβ1 + γDt + (XtDt)β2 + t (3.16)
where Dt takes on a value of zero before a particular break date and a value of
one during and after the break date. In this setup there is uncertainty about the
covariates in the model (Xt ∈ X), the existence of a structural break (whether
equation (15) or (16) is the appropriate model type), and the date in which such a
break may have occurred (Dt). I assume that if a variable appears in a particular
structural break model, its coefficient is allowed to break. This reduces the model
space, enabling me to compute analytical results.
As in earlier sections, inclusion probabilities can be obtained for individual
covariates. Posterior probabilities can also be calculated for the existence and
location of a structural break. Mathematically, the posterior probability that a
structural break exists is
Pr(“break”|Y ) ∝ p(Y |“break”) Pr(“break”) (3.17)
20I do not consider the asymmetry model since the number of recession observations is greatly
reduced when the sample is split in two. This means, for example, that a break date during the
last decade of the sample would cause post-break policy to be identified solely off of the fiscal
policy response to the Great Recession, an unusually severe and prolonged recession.
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where
p(Y |“break”) =
∑
Xt∈X
∑
Dt
p(Y |Xt, Dt, “break”) Pr(Xt|Dt, “break”) Pr(Dt|“break”)
(3.18)
is the marginal likelihood averaged across the set of structural break models using
priors Pr(Xt|Dt, “break”) and Pr(Dt|“break”) as weights, and where Pr(“break”)
is the prior probability that a structural break exists. Posterior probabilities for
different break dates are calculated in a similar manner,
Pr(Dt|“break”, Y ) ∝ p(Y |Dt, “break”) Pr(Dt|“break”) (3.19)
where Pr(Dt|“break”) is the prior probability that a particular break date is the
true break date.
Since I have no prior beliefs about the existence and location of a structural
break, the date range I test for a break as well as the prior probabilities I use in
(17)-(19) reflect that. Following the recommendation in Andrews (1993), I use a
15% trimming value for a date range of (1973q2,2009q1). I set Pr(“break”), the
prior probability that a break exists, equal to 0.5 and Pr(Dt|“break”), the prior
probability that the break occurred at a particular date, equal to 1
c
where c = 144
is the total number of dates under consideration. I use the same model prior,
Pr(Xt|Dt, “break”), that I use to obtain my baseline results.21
In contrast with previous studies, I find little evidence that a shift in policy
conduct occurred sometime during the past fifty years. The posterior probability
21Results are unchanged when I use the alternate model priors discussed in section 4.2 instead.
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that a break occurred, Pr(“break”|Y ), is .48%. Similarly, the posterior odds ratio,
Pr(“no break”|Y )
Pr(“break”|Y ) (3.20)
indicates that the possibility that a break did not occur is 209 times more likely
than the possibility that one did. This result is hard to overturn, requiring prior
probabilities that overwhelmingly favor the existence of a break. As Table 9
demonstrates, Pr(“break”) must be set to more than 99% to produce a posterior
probability greater than 50%.
4.5 Spending and Tax Responses
Thus far, policy has been measured as the portion of the deficit resulting from
discretionary policy actions. While this measure has the advantage of summarizing
overall policy, it does not distinguish between taxes and spending. Consequently it
is useful to separately estimate tax and spending responses to determine whether
Congress has relied more heavily on one fiscal lever than the other in responding to
the business cycle. For the results below I replace the cyclically-adjusted deficit and
its lags in equation (2) with the relevant fiscal measure.
My results, presented in Table 10, indicate that earlier results are driven
primarily by taxes. Inclusion probabilities for the tax specification closely resemble
those in section 4.1, suggesting that taxes have a high probability of responding
to business cycle measures, particularly the change in the unemployment rate.
The coefficient posterior mean for this variable is large and negative, indicating a
countercyclical response. In contrast, the spending response to the business cycle
appears to be much more modest. The probability that any one of the six business
cycle measures belongs in the underlying spending model is 67.5% and, as Figure 8
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TABLE 9. Structural Break Evidence
Pr(“break”) Pr(“break”|Y )
50% 0.48%
75% 1.42%
90% 4.13%
99% 32.1%
99.9% 82.7%
Notes: The first column displays different priors for the existence of a break date,
Pr(“break”), while the second column displays the corresponding posteriors,
Pr(“break”|Y ).
makes clear, coefficient posterior distributions for these variables are centered on or
near zero even conditional on being included in the model.
It is surprising that spending appears unlikely to respond to economic
conditions given that unemployment benefit extensions and grants to states, both
of which are included in cyclically-adjusted outlays, have been part of the federal
response to many recent recessions.22 It is therefore worth considering how results
change when variations of the spending measure are used. As defined, cyclically-
adjusted outlays include spending on defense and interest payments, neither of
which are likely to be adjusted in response to the state of the economy. Instead,
defense spending should depend primarily on U.S. military operations while interest
payments are predetermined. Together, spending on defense and interest comprises
nearly 40% of total cyclically-adjusted outlays over my fifty-year sample, which
may make it harder to detect an empirical relationship between spending and
business cycle measures even if one exists.
Cyclically-adjusted outlays also exclude two categories of spending commonly
associated with fiscal stimulus legislation: gross government investment and capital
22Unemployment benefit extensions are not counted as automatic stabilizers because they
require legislation to be enacted.
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TABLE 10. BMA Results for Cyclically-Adjusted Tax Revenues and Outlays
Variable Revenues Outlays
Dep. Var. First Lag 0.62 0.84
(100%) (100%)
Dep. Var. Second Lag 0.26 0.02
(96.7%) (10.1%)
Time Trend 0.00 0.00
(2.2%) (1.8%)
Total Output Gap 0.00 -0.01
(9.1%) (55.2%)
GDP Growth 0.00 0.00
(2.5%) (4.9%)
Unemployment Gap 0.00 0.00
(3.4%) (9.3%)
Unemployment Change -0.44 0.01
(99.5%) (4.6%)
Debt 0.00 0.00
(11.7%) (1.8%)
Federal Funds Rate 0.00 0.00
(12.8%) (1.7%)
Total Inflation 0.00 0.00
(13.3%) (4.6%)
Presidential Election 0.00 0.00
(1.8%) (3.2%)
United Government 0.00 0.00
(1.9%) (3.6%)
Notes: coefficient estimates are on the same line as the corresponding variable name while
inclusion probabilities are in parentheses. Results are bolded for variables with inclusion
probabilities greater than 50%. Results for the third policy lag are omitted.
transfer payments. The former includes direct federal spending on structures
such as schools and highways, while the latter includes grants to state and local
governments for additional transportation infrastructure.23
23See “Concepts and Methods of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts” at
https://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/allchapters.pdf for further explanation.
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FIGURE 8. Coefficient Posterior Distributions (Spending Specification)
Notes: for variables with inclusion probabilities less than 100% the large point mass at
zero is ignored. Red lines indicate 5%, 50%, and 95% percentiles. Results for the third
policy lag are omitted.
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It is worth noting that government investment and capital transfer payments, which
include spending on “shovel-ready projects,” together accounted for just over 14%
of the total expenditures included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act.24 However, it is possible that they have played a larger role in government
responses to other economic events over the past fifty years.
Column 1 of Table 11 presents inclusion probabilities and averaged coefficient
estimates for the unadjusted spending variable alongside results for two variations
of this measure. The first, whose corresponding results are listed in column 2,
excludes spending on defense and interest payments. The second, whose results
are listed in column 3, adds gross government investment and capital transfer
payments to the measure in column 2. Table 11 shows that alternate definitions
of discretionary spending provide stronger evidence that policymakers adjust
spending in response to the business cycle. The inclusion probability for the change
in the unemployment rate increases from 4.6% to 66.4% when spending on defense
and interest payments is excluded, and increases further to 85.1% when gross
investment and capital transfers are added. Similarly, the probability that any of
the business cycle measures belongs in the model is about 95% for both alternate
spending definitions. Coefficient posteriors suggest that spending responses are
countercyclical. The coefficient posterior mean for the change in the unemployment
rate is much larger in magnitude than for the unadjusted spending variable, albeit
smaller than the response estimated for the tax specification. In sum, it appears
that policymakers respond to the business cycle with a combination of tax and
spending changes, although taxes tend to make up a larger portion of the response.
24See “Effect of the ARRA on Selected Federal Government Sector Transactions” at
https://www.bea.gov/recovery/pdf/arra-table.pdf.
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TABLE 11. BMA Results for Alternate Spending Variables
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Outlays First Lag 0.84 0.70 0.56
(100%) (100%) (100%)
Outlays Second Lag 0.02 0.04 0.40
(10.1%) (19.2%) (100%)
Total Output Gap -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(55.2%) (40.2%) (13.5%)
GDP Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.9%) (3.7%) (5.9%)
Unemployment Gap 0.00 0.00 0.00
(9.3%) (7.9%) (2.6%)
Unemployment Change 0.01 0.17 0.23
(4.6%) (66.4%) (85.1%)
Notes: column (1) lists results for the unadjusted spending variable. Column (2)
removes spending on defense and interest payments from (1) and column (3) adds gross
investment and capital transfers to (2). Coefficient estimates are on the same line as the
corresponding variable name while inclusion probabilities are in parentheses. Results are
bolded for variables with inclusion probabilities greater than 50%.
4.6 Intended Policy
Since Orphanides (2001), it has become common to assess monetary and fiscal
policy conduct using both real-time and ex post data. Ex post data is useful for
estimating actual policy outcomes but it may do a poor job of explaining intended
policy if the information available to policymakers in real time differs substantially
from fully revised data. In that case, intended policy responses can be estimated by
replacing ex post data with real-time data. Using real-time data, studies of fiscal
policy in European and OECD countries have often concluded that intended policy
is more countercyclical than actual policy. Cohen and Follette (2003), in contrast,
find that in the United States intended policy is less countercyclical than actual
policy. They estimate a countercyclical response to the output gap using both ex
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post and real-time data, but find that the magnitude of the response is about half
as large when real-time data is used.
In line with the existing literature, I estimate intended responses to the
business cycle by replacing ex post data for business cycle measures with real-time
data and re-estimating equation (2). Real-time data for each variable is available
from the Archival Federal Reserve Economic Data (ALFRED) database. Because
of data availability, I am forced to make a number of alterations to my dataset.
First, real-time data for the CBO output gap and unemployment gap are available
only for recent years so I exclude both as possible covariates. This reduces the
total number of business cycle measures to four: two measures of the output gap,
GDP growth, and the change in the unemployment rate.25 Second, my real-time
dataset begins in 1968q4 instead of 1966q1, again because of data availability.26
Fortunately, results using ex post data for the smaller set of covariates and shorter
sample, listed in column 1 of Table 12, are very similar to those presented in earlier
sections, suggesting that such alterations are inconsequential.
My results indicate that there is little difference between intended and actual
policy: estimated responses to business cycle measures, shown in column 2 of Table
12, are largely unchanged when real-time data is used. The estimated response to
the change in the unemployment rate falls from 0.58 to 0.56, a difference of 3.5%,
while the response to GDP growth is close to zero using both ex post and real-
time data. The estimated response to the output gap changes by a large amount
proportionally, from -0.01 to 0.00, but the magnitude of this coefficient is small
25Real-time data is available for potential output at an annual frequency from 1991 and
biannual frequency from 1999 and is available for the natural rate of unemployment from 2011.
26Real-time data for GDP is available from 1965 but the estimation of the Hamilton output
gap, which involves regressing yt+h on yt,· · · ,yt−3 causes me to lose observations for the first three
years.
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TABLE 12. BMA Results for Real-Time Business Cycle Measures
Variable Ex Post Real Time
CA Deficit First Lag 0.68 0.69
(100%) (100%)
CA Deficit Second Lag 0.25 0.25
(94.1%) (93.7%)
Time Trend 0.00 0.00
(4.7%) (4.8%)
Total Output Gap -0.01 0.00
(24.6%) (10.0%)
GDP Growth 0.00 0.00
(3.9%) (5.9%)
Unemployment Change 0.58 0.56
(96.0%) (97.9%)
Debt 0.00 0.00
(6.4%) (7.5%)
Federal Funds Rate 0.00 0.00
(6.2%) (5.8%)
Total Inflation -0.01 -0.01
(37.2%) (44.1%)
Presidential Election 0.01 0.01
(6.3%) (6.3%)
United Government 0.00 0.00
(5.1%) (4.9%)
Notes: coefficient estimates are on the same line as the corresponding variable name while
inclusion probabilities are in parentheses. Results are bolded for variables with inclusion
probabilities greater than 50%.
enough relative to the coefficient on the change in the unemployment rate that it
has little bearing on overall conclusions.
It is worth noting that, although small, the differences in results that I
estimate using ex post and real-time data are in line with the finding by Cohen
and Follette (2003) that intended policy is less countercyclical than actual policy.
For both the change in the unemployment rate and the output gap, the sign of
the coefficient posterior mean is unaffected when real-time data is used but the
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magnitude is smaller. It is possible that Cohen and Follette overestimate the
magnitude of policy differences because they assume that policymakers respond to
the output gap, a variable that I estimate to have a low probability of belonging in
the underlying model. Re-estimating equation (2), first-differencing the dependent
variable as in Cohen and Follette, confirms this. Conditional on inclusion in the
model, the coefficient posterior mean for the output gap falls from -0.05 when ex
post data is used to -0.02 when real-time data is used. This result is very similar to
the values of -0.04 and -0.02 estimated by Cohen and Follette.
The output gap may produce larger differences in estimated policy responses
because it is less accurate in real-time than the change in the unemployment
rate. The information presented in Table 13 supports this idea. The first column,
intended to convey average revision size for each business cycle measure, lists the
average magnitude of revisions to each variable as a percentage of the average
magnitude of the corresponding variable, measured using ex post data. The second
column, intended to convey the frequency with which policymakers have had
access to accurate real-time data, lists the percentage of observations for which
the magnitude of a variable’s revision is smaller than five percent of the variable’s
average magnitude, again measured using ex post data. Table 13 indicates that
real-time data for the change in the unemployment rate has been more accurate
than real-time data for the other business cycle measures. Policymakers have
had access to accurate real-time data for this variable more often than for other
business cycle measures, and when real-time data has been inaccurate, revisions
have tended to be smaller in magnitude than revisions to other variables.
In sum, the use of the output gap may yield inaccurate conclusions about
differences between actual and intended policy. Posterior probabilities indicate that
policymakers are much less likely to respond to the output gap, a variable prone
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TABLE 13. Business Cycle Measure Revision Summary
Variable
Average Revision
Size
RT Accuracy
Frequency
Output Gap (TB) 89.6% 1.6%
Output Gap (Hamilton) 43.5% 6.3%
GDP Growth 42.8% 6.4%
Unemployment Change 35.6% 24.5%
Notes: “Average Revision Size” is calculated as the average revision magnitude as a
percentage of the average ex post variable magnitude while “RT Accuracy Frequency” is
calculated as the percentage of observations for which the revision magnitude is less than
five percent of the ex post variable magnitude.
to relatively large and frequent inaccuracies in real time, than to the change in
the unemployment rate, a variable that is more accurate in real time. Accounting
for model uncertainty and in contrast with Cohen and Follette (2003), I find little
difference between intended policy and actual policy outcomes in the United States.
5. Conclusion
The conduct of discretionary fiscal policy has been the subject of a large
number of papers. Nevertheless, these papers have failed to yield a consensus on
even the most basic aspects of policy, such as whether and how it responds to
the business cycle. Conflicting results may stem in part from model uncertainty,
particularly uncertainty about which covariates belong in the underlying model
of fiscal policy. Motivated by discrepancies in the existing literature, I estimate
the response of U.S. policy to different business cycle measures using a Bayesian
approach that explicitly incorporates model uncertainty. My results indicate
that policy responds to business cycle measures, particularly the change in the
unemployment rate, in a countercyclical manner. These countercyclical responses
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are driven by large responses to recessions. During expansions, in contrast,
policy shows little indication of responding to economic conditions. Policymakers
appear to rely more heavily on tax cuts than spending increases during recessions,
although I find evidence that both change in response to the change in the
unemployment rate. Finally, I find no evidence of a structural break in my model
coefficients, nor of substantive differences between intended policy and actual policy
outcomes.
Although my focus in this paper is on responses to the business cycle, my
finding that debt has little effect on discretionary fiscal policy relates to a large and
growing literature on fiscal and monetary policy switching. In that literature there
exist two fiscal policy regimes, active and passive, where the regimes are defined by
whether or not fiscal policy stabilizes debt. My results suggest that if fiscal policy
can be described as operating under two regimes, those regimes may be better
defined by whether the economy is in a recession or an expansion, with the terms
“active” and “passive” referring to whether or not fiscal policy responds to business
cycle measure.
The conduct of federal discretionary fiscal policy is an important topic in and
of itself. However, any analysis of fiscal policy is incomplete as long as it excludes
non-discretionary and subnational policy. Both types of policy operate under very
different conditions from federal discretionary policy and as such likely respond
to the economy in very different ways. Applying the techniques employed in this
paper to either type of policy is an obvious avenue for future research.
75
CHAPTER IV
REGIME SWITCHING IN U.S. FISCAL POLICY
1. Introduction
The Great Recession prompted large-scale fiscal policy initiatives throughout
the world. In the years since, policymakers and academics alike have vigorously
debated the efficacy of such policy, focusing primarily on the sign and magnitude
of spending and tax multipliers. A key question that has emerged is whether such
multipliers are regime dependent. There is some evidence to suggest that they are,
depending on the amount of slack in the economy, the stance of monetary policy,
and other macroeconomic characteristics.1
A related question is whether the implementation of fiscal policy, particularly
discretionary fiscal policy, is regime dependent. This topic has received some
attention in empirical work. For example, a number of authors have determined
that the cyclicality of discretionary policy differs according to the state of the
business cycle.2 Others have found that policy responses depend on the level of
outstanding public debt.3 While these findings are suggestive, they often rely
on strong assumptions about the underlying model. For instance, many of the
aforementioned authors conclude that policy responses vary over the business
cycle because estimated responses to positive and negative values of the output
gap differ. The implicit assumption in these papers is that policy regimes are
1See, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska (2015),
Ramey and Zubairy (2018), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), and Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Vegh (2013).
2See Falconer (2018), Cimadomo (2007), Forni and Momigliano (2004), and Cohen and Follette
(2003).
3See Combes, Minea, and Sow (2017) and Egert (2012).
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determined by the value of the output gap, where the specific value that initiates
a regime switch is zero. More generally, the variables and corresponding values
that define regimes are frequently imposed rather than estimated in this literature.
Additionally, since the tendency is to focus on switching in the response to a
particular variable, responses to other variables are often assumed to be invariant
across regimes. In sum, the models used previously to examine state dependence
in discretionary fiscal policy have allowed for relatively little uncertainty about the
structure of the underlying model governing such dependence.
In this paper I search for evidence of regime dependence in federal
discretionary fiscal policy conduct in the United States. My interest is primarily
in whether policy is better modeled as a linear or regime-switching process and,
if the latter, which variables and values characterize regime switching. I am also
interested, to a lesser extent, in which variables policy responds to as well as the
responses to these variables across regimes. It should be noted that this was the
focus of Falconer (2018), which found that policy is more countercyclical during
recessions than during expansions. My aim, then, is not to retread the same ground
but rather to determine whether the conclusions of that paper are robust to the use
of more plausible regime definitions.
This paper not only extends the existing literature on fiscal policy conduct,
but also complements existing work on regime dependent fiscal multipliers. If the
effectiveness of fiscal policy varies according to the value of some variable, it is
important to determine whether policy conduct exhibits a similar pattern. Indeed,
if policy is more effective at certain times than at others, policymakers may want to
modify existing policy to take advantage of that fact, if they do not do so already.
I evaluate regime dependence in discretionary policy by using Bayesian model
comparison techniques to compare a large number of linear and regime-switching
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models motivated by the existing literature. Doing so enables me to determine
which models are most likely to have generated the data and, correspondingly,
which model characteristics are most plausible. I assume that regime switching
is limited to the underlying model’s coefficients, which can be represented with a
threshold model. I allow for uncertainty about the underlying model’s covariates
and, conditional on that model being a threshold model, its threshold variable
and threshold value. As a result, the models that I estimate differ across each
of those dimensions. I consider twenty-nine possible threshold variables related
to the business cycle, debt scenario, monetary policy, inflation, and the political
environment. After obtaining measures of uncertainty about the characteristics of
the underlying model I incorporate that uncertainty into parameter estimates using
Bayesian model averaging.
My results provide strong evidence that discretionary fiscal policy is regime
dependent. Posterior probabilities indicate that the set of threshold models is at
least five times more likely than the set of linear models. This result is hard to
overturn, requiring prior probabilities that greatly favor the set of linear models.
Among the threshold variables that I consider, the change in nonfarm payrolls
and change in the federal funds rate are the most likely drivers of regime change.
Notably, the sign of the output gap has a very low probability of defining regimes.
The same is true of the five debt variables that I consider.
Threshold value posteriors support the idea that the change in nonfarm
payrolls and the change in the federal funds rate identify similar regimes. Extreme
negative values have the highest posterior probability for both variables, splitting
observations into periods of “normal” and “bad” macroeconomic conditions that
roughly coincide with recession dates. The number of “bad” episodes that occurred
in the United States between 1966 and 2016 is smaller when the change in nonfarm
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payrolls is used as the threshold variable than when the change in the federal funds
rate is used, but the duration of these episodes is typically longer.
Finally, inclusion probabilities and coefficient posterior means largely
corroborate the findings in Falconer (2018): policy is persistent and has a high
probability of responding to changes in the labor market. Responses to the labor
market are mostly limited to periods of weak economic performance, however;
at other times policy is slightly countercyclical or acyclical. Fiscal policymakers
may also follow the Federal Reserve’s lead during the “bad” regime, implementing
expansionary fiscal policy in the quarter following expansionary monetary policy.
During the “normal” regime, in contrast, there is no evidence of comovement
between fiscal and monetary policy. In sum, my results support the idea that fiscal
policymakers drastically alter policy when the economy is doing poorly, responding
more strongly (and countercyclically) to the business cycle. The decision to alter
policy appears to depend either directly on labor market developments or on
the actions of the Federal Reserve in response to these and other macroeconomic
developments.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the linear and threshold
models I consider as well as Bayesian model comparison and Bayesian model
averaging. Section 3 describes data sources and variable definitions and Section 4
presents results. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Methodology
2.1 Linear Models
The starting point for my analysis is the set of models in Falconer (2018).4
The results of that paper indicate that there is substantial uncertainty about the
covariates in the underlying fiscal policy model. Consequently I consider j=1,
. . . , J linear regression models, each of which differs with respect to the included
covariates. Formally, I estimate
CAD =αιT +Xjβj +  (4.1)
where CAD is a T × 1 vector holding observations of the cyclically-adjusted deficit,
ιT is a T × 1 vector of ones, Xj ∈ X is a T × kj matrix containing the regressors in
model j, and  is assumed to be N(0T ,h
−1 IT ). As suggested in Fernandez, Ley and
Steel (2001b), each of the variables in X is de-meaned to ensure that the intercept,
α, has the same interpretation in each model.
The cyclically-adjusted deficit measures what the deficit would be if the
economy were at full employment. It is constructed to eliminate the effects of
automatic stabilizers on the deficit and should, as a result, reflect discretionary
fiscal policy actions.5 The cyclically-adjusted deficit is used throughout the
literature as a measure of discretionary fiscal policy.6 I use cyclically-adjusted net
federal government savings, published for the United States by the Congressional
4Greater detail can be found in that paper.
5Automatic stabilizers are defined as automatic changes in government revenues and
expenditures that occur in response to the business cycle.
6See Auerbach (2002) and (2003) as well as Cohen and Follette (2003) and Falconer (2018) for
its use in studying U.S. discretionary fiscal policy.
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Budget Office (CBO), as my discretionary fiscal policy measure and for simplicity
refer to it as the cyclically-adjusted deficit for the remainder of the paper.7
The variables in X are motivated by the existing literature as well as the
results of Falconer (2018). It includes five business cycle measures: the CBO output
gap, real GDP growth, the change in nonfarm payrolls, the CBO unemployment
gap, and the change in the unemployment rate (called U-3 by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics). I assume that discretionary fiscal policy is unable to respond to the
business cycle within a quarter, an assumption used throughout the fiscal multiplier
literature.8 As a result, I include the first lag of each business cycle measure in
all models. The other variables in X are: the level of publicly-held federal debt,
the nominal federal funds rate, CPI inflation, three lags of the cyclically-adjusted
deficit, and two political indicator variables. The first political variable is equal to
one during presidential election years and the other is equal to one during quarters
in which Congress and the presidency were controlled by the same party. Section 3
provides greater detail about variable definitions.
2.2 Threshold Models
I model regime dependence in discretionary fiscal policy conduct using
threshold models of the form
CADt =α +X
′
tβ + δDt + (XtDt)
′θ + t (4.2)
Dt =1 if Zt−1 ≥ γ (4.3)
7For ease of interpretation, I reversed the sign of this variable so that a positive value indicates
a deficit and a negative value indicates a surplus.
8Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) are two prominent
examples.
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where CAD and X are, as before, the cyclically-adjusted deficit and the model
covariates, Z is the threshold variable, and γ is the threshold value. Note that,
conditional on a particular threshold variable and value, the threshold model above
can be written as a linear regression model using regime indicator variable D. As a
result, estimation proceeds in the same manner as for linear models.
As equations (2) and (3) make clear, I assume there are two regimes, where
the current regime depends on the value of the threshold variable in the previous
period. In other words, the split between regimes is determined by a particular
value, γ, of the threshold variable, Z, in the previous quarter. I also assume
a discrete transition between regimes, although as discussed below I allow for
uncertainty about the threshold value that initiates a regime switch. Finally, I
assume that if a covariate is included in a particular model, the response to that
covariate is allowed to differ across regimes. Consequently each included covariate
appears twice in a given threshold model: once by itself and once interacted
with regime indicator variable D. This assumption reduces the model space and,
correspondingly, the computational burden of implementing Bayesian model
comparison and Bayesian model averaging.
In addition to allowing for uncertainty about the included covariates, for
threshold models I also allow for uncertainty about the threshold variables and
values that govern regime switching. As a result, threshold models differ with
respect to each of these model characteristics. Table 14 provides a list of the
threshold variables and range of threshold values that I consider. All threshold
variables are variations of possible covariates, or closely related in concept. They
enable me to consider potential regime dependence in fiscal policy responses driven
by the business cycle phase, debt scenario, monetary policy regime, inflation rate,
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TABLE 14. Threshold Variables and Values Considered for Model Comparison
Threshold Variable Variable Type
Number of
Values
Threshold Value
Range
Recession Indicator 1 1
Output Gap Level 146 [-3.29,1.03]
Change 146 [-0.66,0.68]
Level Sign 1 1
Change Sign 1 1
Real GDP Growth Level 146 [0.25,6.03]
Sign 1 1
Nonfarm Payrolls Change 146 [-0.13,0.90]
Change Sign 1 1
Unemployment Gap Level 109 [-0.92,2.3]
Sign 1 1
Unemployment Rate Change 7 [-0.3,0.3]
Change Sign 1 1
Publicly-Held Debt Level 146 [32.63,77.77]
Change 146 [-0.58,1.16]
Change Sign 1 1
Debt Gap Level 146 [0.001,4.18]
Debt Ceiling Increase Indicator 1 1
Federal Funds Rate Level 128 [0.36,9.32]
Change 77 [-0.72,0.65]
Change Sign 1 1
CPI Inflation Level 146 [1.61,6.88]
Change 146 [-1.67,1.87]
Change Sign 1 1
Presidential Election Indicator 1 1
President (Democrat) Indicator 1 1
United (Either Party) Indicator 1 1
United (Democrat) Indicator 1 1
United (Republican) Indicator 1 1
Notes: “Number of Values” refers to the number of threshold values I consider for a
particular threshold variable. For indicator variables the only threshold value considered
is 1. Variable definitions can be found in Section 3.
and political landscape. Note that the “debt gap” refers to the difference between
the debt ceiling and the current level of debt.
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2.3 Bayesian Model Comparison
Bayesian model comparison involves the calculation of posterior model
probabilities that indicate the probability that a particular model is the underlying
model that generated the data. Posterior probabilities for linear models are
calculated as
Pr(Mj|L, Y ) = p(Y |Mj, L)Pr(Mj|L)∑J
i=1 p(Y |Mi, L)Pr(Mi|L)
(4.4)
where p(Y |Mj, L) is a model’s marginal likelihood and Pr(Mj|L) is its prior.
Conditional on a particular threshold variable, Zr, and threshold value, γ, posterior
probabilities for threshold models are calculated as
Pr(Mj|γ, Zr, NL, Y ) ∝ p(Y |Mj, γ, Zr, NL)Pr(Mj|γ, Zr, NL) (4.5)
where p(Y |Mj, γ, Zr, NL) is a model’s marginal likelihood and Pr(Mj|γ, Zr, NL) is
its prior. Note that L stands for linear and NL stands for nonlinear.
A model’s marginal likelihood, defined as the average value of the likelihood
function over the model’s parameter prior, measures how well the model explains
the data. It is similar in concept to the maximized value of the likelihood function
often used by frequentists for the purpose of model comparison. However, instead
of measuring model performance based on a single set of parameter values, the
marginal likelihood measures model performance over a range of parameter
values, where the range of values is determined by the parameter prior. As is well
known in the Bayesian literature, larger models are automatically penalized in
84
the marginal likelihood, meaning that, ceteris paribus, smaller models have higher
posterior probabilities than larger models.9
A model’s prior represents the researcher’s beliefs about the model before
seeing the data. If each model has the same prior probability, the posterior model
probabilities in (4) and (5) depend solely on each model’s marginal likelihood.
Conversely, if two models have the same marginal likelihood, the model with
the higher prior probability with also have the higher posterior probability. As
discussed below, I present results for two different model priors, each of which is
relatively agnostic about the underlying model.
Closely related to posterior model probabilities are inclusion probabilities,
which indicate the probability that a particular covariate is in the underlying
model. In the current context, inclusion probabilities enable me to determine which
variables matter to fiscal policymakers. Inclusion probabilities are easily derived
from posterior model probabilities by summing posterior probabilities across models
that include each covariate.
Marginal likelihoods can be used to obtain posterior probabilities for other
objects of interest. For example, in order to determine whether the underlying
model is linear or not, I calculate posterior probabilities for the set of threshold
models as
Pr(NL|Y ) ∝ p(Y |NL)Pr(NL) (4.6)
where p(Y |NL) is the marginal likelihood for the set of threshold models and
Pr(NL) is the prior probability that the underlying model is a threshold model.
Just as the marginal likelihood for a single model averages the likelihood function
over the parameter prior, the marginal likelihood for the set of threshold models
9See Koop (2003) for further explanation.
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averages marginal likelihoods over model, threshold variable, and threshold value
priors. Specifically,
p(Y |NL) =
∑
r
∫
γ
∑
j
p(Y |Mj , γ, Zr, NL)Pr(Mj |γ, Zr, NL)p(γ|Zr, NL)dγPr(Zr|NL) (4.7)
Although γ is a continuous parameter, its effect on the likelihood function
is the same as if it were discrete. This is due to the fact that the split between
regimes remains the same between observed values of a particular threshold
variable. To use the example in Koop and Potter (1997), if the threshold value is
chosen as the 25th smallest observation of the threshold variable, the split between
regimes is constant for alternate threshold values that fall between the 25th and
26th smallest observations. Consequently, marginal likelihoods only need to be
calculated for the values of Zr that are actually observed. In order to integrate
marginal likelihoods over the prior for γ, marginal likelihoods calculated for each
observed value need to be multiplied by the width of the interval in which the split
of the data remains constant and divided by the width of the interval that receives
nonzero prior probability in p(γ|Zr, NL).
Posterior probabilities for threshold variables and threshold values are
calculated as
Pr(Zr|NL, Y ) ∝ p(Y |Zr, NL)Pr(Zr|NL) (4.8)
Pr(γ|Zr, NL, Y ) ∝ p(Y |γ, Zr, NL)p(γ|Zr, NL) (4.9)
As in (7), the marginal likelihoods in (8) and (9) are calculated by averaging
marginal likelihoods for individual models across models and, for p(Y |Zr, NL),
averaging across different values of γ, using the associated prior probabilities as
weights.
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2.4 Bayesian Model Averaging
In addition to posterior probabilities that highlight characteristics of the
underlying model, I am interested in the sign and magnitude of policy responses
to the included covariates. My results indicate that there is uncertainty about the
underlying model of fiscal policy, and that this uncertainty extends to a number
of different model characteristics. Consequently, focusing on results from a single
model, even if that model has the highest posterior probability, may be unwise.
Doing so is especially problematic if multiple plausible models yield different or
even conflicting results.
When there are multiple plausible models, Bayesian model averaging (BMA)
can be used to incorporate uncertainty about those models into parameter
estimates. As its name suggests, BMA proceeds by averaging results across
alternative models using posterior model probabilities as weights. For example,
BMA estimates for linear models are calculated as
p(λ|L, Y ) =
J∑
j=1
p(λ|Mj, L, Y )Pr(Mj|L, Y ) (4.10)
Note that the BMA estimates in (10) are not conditioned on a particular model,
which reduces the likelihood that inferences are driven by model choice. They
also reflect uncertainty about the underlying model since each set of results are
weighted by the model’s posterior probability. This potentially important source of
uncertainty is ignored when estimates come from a single model.
BMA estimates for threshold models are calculated in the same way as for
linear models, although averaging occurs across models with different covariates
and threshold values. I do not average results across models with different
threshold variables because they may capture different types of regime switching.
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Instead, I present results for the threshold variables with the highest posterior
probabilities.
The total number of linear models is equal to the total number of covariate
combinations: 213 = 8, 192. For a given threshold variable, the total number of
threshold models is equal to 213 × V where V is the total number of threshold
values under consideration. Using the information in Table 14, this yields a total of
13,524,992 threshold models. Although these numbers are large, modern computing
speeds combined with the priors I use (discussed below) enable me to calculate
results analytically.
2.5 Priors
In order to calculate the posterior quantities in the previous section, I
require prior probabilities for each linear and threshold model, Pr(Mj|L) and
Pr(Mj|γ, Zr, NL); prior density functions for each set of model parameters,
p(α, h, βj|Mj, L) and p(α, h, βj|Mj, γ, Zr, NL); prior probabilities for each threshold
variable, Pr(Zr|NL); prior density functions for threshold values, p(γ|Zr, NL); and
prior probabilities for the set of linear and threshold models, Pr(L) and Pr(NL).
Each threshold model uses the same model prior as the corresponding linear
model.10 Parameter priors are obtained in the same way for linear and threshold
models, although each threshold model has kj more parameters than its linear
counterpart. All other priors are associated with a single model type (linear or
threshold).
10Each included covariate appears twice in a given threshold model: once by itself and once
interacted with the regime indicator variable, D. Consequently, conditional on a particular
threshold variable and threshold value the number of nonlinear models is equal to the number
of linear models, and the number of nonlinear model sizes is equal to the number of linear model
sizes. This enables me to use the same model prior for linear and nonlinear models.
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I present results for two different model priors. The first assigns equal prior
probability to each model while the second assigns equal prior probability to each
model size.11 For both priors I assume that a particular covariate enters the true
model independently of all other covariates with probability θ, implying a model
prior of the form:
Pr(Mj) = θ
kj(1− θ)K−kj (4.11)
For the first model prior I set θ = 0.5, so that
Pr(Mj) =
1
J
, j = 1, · · · , J (4.12)
Although the prior in (12) is uniform across models, it favors moderately-sized
models because they outnumber small and large models. Indeed, the Binomial
distribution for model size implied by (12) peaks at K/2.
The second prior that I consider, suggested in Ley and Steel (2009), assigns a
prior to θ rather than fixing it at a particular value. Specifically,
θ ∼ Beta(a, b) (4.13)
I set a = 1 and b = 1, which yields a uniform prior for model size. Unlike the other
model prior, this prior favors small and large models over moderately-sized models.
Since the model space is relatively large, I use the automatic procedure
outlined in Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b), hereafter FLS, to set priors for
model parameters. FLS recommend using this procedure when estimating groups
of linear regression models that differ only with respect to the included covariates.
11Falconer (2018) provides greater detail about these priors than what is presented here.
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For each model, improper non-informative priors are used for parameters common
to all models (α and h) and informative priors are used for those that are not (βj).
Specifically,
p(h|Mj) ∝ h−1 (4.14)
p(α|Mj) ∝ 1 (4.15)
βj|h,Mj ∼ N(βj, h−1(gX ′jXj)−1) (4.16)
where (gX ′jXj)
−1 is the g-prior of Zellner (1986). I set β
j
= 0kj and g =
1/max{T,K2}, again as recommended in FLS.
Note that the “benchmark” prior in (14)-(16) contains a single
hyperparameter, g, whose value is chosen based on prespecified criteria. The
FLS procedure is useful because it requires little subjective information from
the researcher and, as the authors demonstrate, generates priors that have little
influence on posterior quantities. Simulations indicate that these priors also
produce accurate posterior model probabilities.
I assign equal prior probabilities to the set of linear and threshold models, so
that
Pr(L) = Pr(NL) =
1
2
(4.17)
I do the same for each threshold variable:
Pr(Zr|NL) = 1
R
, r = 1, · · · , R (4.18)
For threshold values, I use a uniform prior over an interval that ensures that at
least 14% of observations are in each regime. In other words, when the threshold
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variable observations are ordered from smallest to largest, the prior is uniform
across the interval that contains the center 72% of observations. Values outside
of this interval receive no prior probability. By preventing extreme values from
being considered as threshold values, this prior reduces the likelihood that results
are driven by outliers. I chose a value of 14% (rather than 15% as recommended
in, for example, Koop and Potter (1997)) because 14% of the observations in
my sample occur during a recession. Using a larger value to determine the prior
interval eliminates values of the considered threshold variables that typically occur
during or near recessions, which my results suggest drive regime switching in fiscal
policy conduct.
3. Data
I use quarterly data covering the period 1966q1-2016q3. Table 15 lists
the source of each of the data series used to construct my final variables. The
cyclically-adjusted deficit, debt, and debt gap are expressed as percentages of
potential GDP (as estimated by the CBO). An augmented Dickey-Fuller test
indicates that the cyclically-adjusted deficit is stationary so I include it and its
lags in levels.12 The change in nonfarm payrolls is calculated as a quarterly growth
rate and the change in the unemployment rate is calculated as a quarterly change
(in percentage points). Inflation is calculated as quarterly growth in the Consumer
Price Index and annualized. Similarly, real GDP growth is calculated as quarterly
growth and annualized. Finally, the political indicator variables take on a value
of one during presidential election years, quarters in which the president was a
Democrat, quarters in which Congress and the presidency were controlled by
12First-differencing the cyclically-adjusted deficit changes the estimated coefficients on the
policy lags but otherwise has no effect on results.
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TABLE 15. Data Sources
Variable Source
Cyclically-adjusted net
federal government savings
Congressional Budget Office
Nominal Potential GDP Congressional Budget Office
Nominal GDP Bureau of Economic Analysis
Nonfarm Payrolls Bureau of Labor Statistics
Unemployment Rate Bureau of Labor Statistics
Natural Rate of Unemployment Congressional Budget Office
Recession Indicator National Bureau of Economic Research
Publicly-Held Debt U.S. Treasury Department
Debt Ceiling White House
Federal Funds Rate Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Consumer Price Index Bureau of Labor Statistics
Presidential Election Indicator The American Presidency Project
Democratic President The American Presidency Project
Republican President The American Presidency Project
United Democrat Indicator The American Presidency Project
United Republican Indicator The American Presidency Project
the Democratic party, and quarters in which Congress and the presidency were
controlled by the Republican party.13
4. Results
4.1 Evidence for Regime Switching
Table 16 presents posterior probabilities for the set of threshold models using
different model type prior probabilities and model priors. When the linear and
threshold models are equally likely under the prior, the posterior probability for
the threshold models is 86% and 100%, respectively, for the different model priors.
As the table makes clear, the set of threshold models has to receive substantially
13I consider a particular party to be in control of the House of Representatives and Senate if at
least 50% of the seats in each chamber of Congress are held by that party.
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TABLE 16. Posterior Probabilities for the Set of Threshold Models
Model Prior=1 Model Prior=2
Pr(NL) = 0.5 85.59% 100%
Pr(NL) = 0.25 66.45% 100%
Pr(NL) = 0.14 50% 99.98%
Pr(NL) = 0.0001 0.06% 79.43%
Notes: “Model Prior=1” assigns equal prior probability to different model sizes while
“Model Prior=2” assigns equal prior probability to each model.
lower prior probability before posterior probabilities favor the set of linear models.
Note, too, that each threshold model has twice as many covariates as its linear
counterpart. These models are penalized for their larger size in both the marginal
likelihood and the model prior that assigns equal prior probability to different
model sizes (“Model Prior=1”).14 Given that, ceteris paribus, linear models have
higher posterior probabilities than threshold models, the posterior probabilities
in Table 16 provide relatively strong evidence that the underlying model exhibits
regime switching.
4.2 Variables Characterizing Regime Switching
Table 17 lists posterior probabilities for the threshold variables in Z. Among
the twenty-nine candidates, the change in nonfarm payrolls and the change in
the federal funds rate are the most likely drivers of regime change. Without
further information it is difficult to determine whether both variables define
similar regimes but this could occur if the Federal Reserve responds directly (and
14“Model Prior=1” actually favors both small and large models over moderately-sized models.
However, since the threshold models with the highest marginal likelihoods contain only a subset of
the possible covariates, these moderately-sized models are penalized for their larger size.
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TABLE 17. Posterior Probabilities for Different Threshold Variables
Threshold Variable Model Prior=1 Model Prior=2
Recession Indicator 0.34% 0.08%
Output Gap Level 0% 0%
Change 0% 0%
Level Sign 0% 0%
Change Sign 0% 0%
Real GDP Growth Level 0% 0%
Sign 0.01% 0%
Nonfarm Payrolls Change 57.75% 51.60%
Change Sign 3.89% 5.01%
Unemployment Gap Level 0% 0%
Sign 0% 0%
Unemployment Rate Change 0.71% 0.52%
Change Sign 0.04% 0.05%
Publicly-Held Debt Level 0% 0%
Change 0% 0%
Change Sign 0% 0%
Debt Gap Level 1.17% 0.56%
Debt Ceiling Increase Indicator 0% 0%
Federal Funds Rate Level 0% 0%
Change 36.01% 42.15%
Change Sign 0% 0%
CPI Inflation Level 0% 0%
Change 0.02% 0.01%
Change Sign 0.02% 0%
Presidential Election Indicator 0% 0%
President (Democrat) Indicator 0.04% 0%
United (Either Party) Indicator 0% 0%
United (Democrat) Indicator 0% 0%
United (Republican) Indicator 0% 0%
Notes: Bolded values indicate a posterior probability greater than 3%. “Model Prior=1”
assigns equal prior probability to different model sizes while “Model Prior=2” assigns
equal prior probability to each model.
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contemporaneously) to the change in nonfarm payrolls, or to changing economic
conditions that are also reflected in employment changes. For example, if monetary
policymakers decrease the federal funds rate in response to a decrease in nonfarm
payrolls, fiscal policymakers may interpret the central bank’s actions as a signal
that the economy is worsening and respond by drastically altering their own
policy. Alternatively, fiscal policymakers may respond directly to the change in
nonfarm payrolls, in which case the seeming importance of the change in the federal
funds rate is merely due to the fact that it responds to the same variable as fiscal
policymakers. The evidence presented in the following sections suggests that both
variables do, in fact, define similar regimes.
The fact that the change in the unemployment rate has a low probability
of triggering regime switches is surprising given that it is highly correlated with
the change in nonfarm payrolls. However, policymakers may view the change
in nonfarm payrolls as a more reliable indicator of labor market conditions,
particularly during expansions. While the signs of both variables are nearly always
in agreement during periods of weak economic growth (meaning that a decrease in
nonfarm payrolls is nearly always accompanied by an increase in the unemployment
rate), the same is not true during expansions. Instead, the unemployment rate
occasionally increases during periods in which employment gains are consistently
positive. Policymakers may hesitate to enact large changes in policy following
a single quarter of unemployment increases, preferring instead to focus on the
direction of employment growth. Returning to Table 17, the fact that the sign of
the change in nonfarm payrolls has a higher posterior probability than the sign of
the change in the unemployment rate provides further evidence in support of this
view.
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It is notable that the signs of the output gap and GDP growth receive
virtually no posterior probability given that these variables have often been
used in the literature to characterize regime switching.15 Similarly, the recession
indicator variable used in Falconer (2018) also does a poor job of defining different
fiscal policy regimes. Finally, fiscal policy does not appear to change noticeably
in response to the current debt situation, a finding at odds with the “active”
and “passive” fiscal policy regimes as defined in the fiscal and monetary policy
switching literature.
4.3 Threshold Values
Figure 9 presents posterior distributions for the threshold value when the
change in nonfarm payrolls and the change in the federal funds rate are used
as threshold variables. Extreme negative values receive the highest posterior
probability for both variables. Altering the threshold value priors, p(γ|Zr, NL), to
allow regimes to contain fewer than 14% of observations again yields the result that
the most negative values are determined to be the most probable. While this means
that the prior, in effect, determines the specific values that receive the highest
posterior probability, the conclusions resulting from different priors are the same.
Specifically, since decreases in both nonfarm payrolls and the federal funds rate
typically occur during periods of weak economic growth, the two regimes defined by
these threshold values are consistent with a “normal” and “bad” economy.
Figure 10 illustrates the probability that the economy was in the “bad”
regime over the entire sample, accounting for uncertainty about the threshold value.
To calculate these probabilities I create, for each possible threshold value, a T × 1
15See, for example, Cimadomo (2007), Forni and Momigliano (2004), Cohen and Follette (2003),
and Egert (2010).
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FIGURE 9. Threshold Value Posterior Distributions
Change in Nonfarm Payrolls Change in the Federal Funds Rate
Notes: The change in nonfarm payrolls is defined as a quarterly growth rate. The
considered values range from -0.13% to 0.90%. The change in the federal funds rate is
measured in percentage points. The considered values range from -0.72 to 0.65.
vector indicating the quarters in which the economy was in the “bad” regime. In
other words, entry t = 1, · · · , T is equal to 1 if the value of the threshold variable
was smaller than the threshold value in period t − 1. I then average across vectors
using threshold value posterior probabilities as weights.16
This figure indicates that both threshold variables define similar regimes,
which appear to be closely related to recession dates. However, there are some
apparent differences between the two pictures. First, the number of “bad” episodes
is smaller when the change in nonfarm payrolls is used as the threshold variable,
but the duration of each event is typically longer. These events also correspond
more closely to recession dates than those identified using the change in the federal
funds rate. Second, there is less uncertainty about whether the economy was in a
particular regime using the change in nonfarm payrolls: the probability of being
16Note that this vector is simply ιT − D where D is the T × 1 indicator variable used in each
threshold model.
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FIGURE 10. Probability of Being in the “Bad” Regime
Change in Nonfarm Payrolls
Change in the Federal Funds Rate
Notes: The probabilities above account for uncertainty about the threshold value.
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in the “bad” regime is nearly always 100% or less than 1%. In contrast, when the
change in the federal funds rate is used there are a number of quarters in which the
probability of being in the “bad” regime is between 5% and 85%. These differences
reflect the fact that there is less uncertainty about the threshold value for the
change in nonfarm payrolls. Finally, the economy spends slightly less time in the
“bad” regime when the change in nonfarm payrolls is used as the threshold value.
This difference is small, however: the probability that the economy was in the
“bad” regime exceeds 50% for 14.4% of observations for the change in nonfarm
payrolls compared to 15.3% of observations for the change in the federal funds rate.
4.4 Inclusion Probabilities and Posterior Means
Table 18 lists inclusion probabilities for possible covariates in both model
types (linear and threshold). These probabilities indicate the likelihood that a
particular covariate is in the underlying model and, therefore, whether that variable
appears to be important to policymakers. Note that the probabilities in Table
18 are averaged across all possible threshold variables and threshold values using
posterior probabilities for these model characteristics as weights.
Inclusion probabilities for threshold models closely resemble those for linear
models. They suggest that policy is persistent and responsive to changes in the
labor market: the probability that either the change in the unemployment rate
or the change in nonfarm payrolls (or both) are in the underlying model exceeds
95% for both model types and model priors. Posterior probability is shared more
equally between these two variables in the threshold case due to the fact that the
inclusion probability for the change in nonfarm payrolls is greater than 99% when
this variable is used as the threshold variable, while the inclusion probability for
the change in the unemployment rate is less than 1%. This causes the change in
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TABLE 18. Inclusion Probabilities for Threshold and Linear Models
Threshold Linear
Variable Prior=1 Prior=2 Prior=1 Prior=2
CA Deficit First Lag 100% 100% 100% 100%
CA Deficit Second Lag 70.76% 87.84% 94.63% 97.52%
Output Gap 0.45% 0.87% 12.23% 19.94%
Real GDP Growth 0.40% 0.53% 3.94% 7.07%
Payrolls Change 39.57% 39.80% 24.94% 23.51%
Unemployment Gap 0.23% 0.57% 7.86% 13.17%
Unemployment Change 55.70% 60.12% 79.58% 84.78%
Debt 0.32% 0.85% 8.08% 15.99%
Federal Funds Rate 0.93% 2.45% 6.39% 11.28%
Inflation 1.10% 3.04% 25.94% 41.81%
Presidential Election 0.17% 0.46% 5.09% 9.36%
United Government 0.16% 0.44% 5.25% 9.63%
Unemployment or Payrolls Change 95.09% 99.4% 99.57% 99.82%
Notes: Inclusion probabilities for threshold models are averaged across threshold variables
and threshold values using posterior probabilities Pr(γ|Zr, NL, Y ) and Pr(Zr|NL, Y ) as
weights.
nonfarm payrolls to be weighted more heavily in the averaging process because it
has a relatively high probability of being the threshold variable.
As in Falconer (2018), policy appears to be unresponsive to the other
covariates that I consider. In general, posterior probabilities for these variables
are smaller for the threshold models than for the linear models because additional
variables are penalized more in this model type. However, both model types
produce similar conclusions about the relative importance of each covariate to
policymakers.
Table 19 presents coefficient posterior means for the “bad” and “normal”
regimes using the two most likely threshold variables. Posteriors are averaged
across all possible covariate combinations and threshold values using joint posterior
probabilities Pr(Mj, γ|Zr, NL, Y ) as weights. Consequently coefficients on variables
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TABLE 19. Posterior Means Averaged Across Models and Thresholds
Payrolls Change FFR Change
“Bad”
Regime
“Normal”
Regime
“Bad”
Regime
“Normal”
Regime
CA Deficit First Lag 0.32 0.95 0.12 0.85
CA Deficit Second Lag 0.08 0.03 0.71 0.03
Output Gap 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Real GDP Growth 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Payrolls Change -2.11 -0.08 -0.15 -0.04
Unemployment Gap 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unemployment Change 0.03 0.00 0.80 0.15
Debt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Federal Funds Rate -0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.00
Inflation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Presidential Election 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United Government 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.01
Notes: Posterior means are averaged across all possible covariate combinations and
threshold values using Pr(Mj |Zr, NL, Y ) and p(γ|Zr, NL, Y ) as weights. Variables with
inclusion probabilities greater than 30% are bolded.
with low inclusion probabilities are shrunk towards zero. Posterior distributions for
coefficients conditional on the associated variable being in the model are located
in Figure 11. These graphs ignore the large point mass at zero for covariates with
inclusion probabilities below 100%.
Both sets of results are largely consistent with the findings in Falconer (2018).
They indicate that during the “normal” regime discretionary fiscal policy is very
persistent and slightly countercyclical or acyclical, whereas during the “bad” regime
policy is less persistent and strongly countercyclical.17 Specifically, an acceleration
17The posterior mean for the coefficient on the first lag of the dependent variable suggests
that this variable is nonstationary during the “normal” regime. As mentioned in section 3, first-
differencing the dependent variable has very little effect on overall results, with the obvious
exception that coefficients and inclusion probabilities for the lags of the dependent variable
change.
101
FIGURE 11. Coefficient Posterior Distributions Conditional on Inclusion
“Normal” Regime, Zr: Payrolls Change “Bad” Regime, Zr: Payrolls Change
“Normal” Regime, Zr: FFR Change “Bad” Regime, Zr: FFR Change
Notes: The posterior distributions above ignore the large point mass that occurs at zero
for variables with inclusion probabilities less than 100%. The left and right red lines
designate the 95% central posterior interval while the middle red line is the posterior
median.
in unemployment increases and payroll decreases leads to expansionary policy (an
increase in the cyclically-adjusted deficit).
Since each business cycle measure is expressed in different units, it is difficult
to compare the magnitude of responses to these variables across threshold variables
using the coefficients in Table 19. To facilitate that comparison, Table 20 presents,
for each threshold variable and regime, posterior means for the implied response
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TABLE 20. Business Cycle Responses For Different Threshold Variables
Payrolls Change FFR Change
“Normal” Regime -$13.06 -$13.83
“Bad” Regime $181.35 $72.23
Notes: Responses are expressed in billions of 2016q3 dollars. For the “normal” regime I
calculate the total response to one-standard deviation increases in the output gap, GDP
growth, and the change in nonfarm payrolls and one-standard deviation decreases in the
unemployment gap and unemployment change. For the “bad” regime I consider changes
of the opposite sign.
(in billions of 2016q3 dollars) of the cyclically-adjusted deficit to one-standard
deviation changes in each business cycle measure.18 For the “bad” regime I consider
the total response to one-standard deviation decreases in the output gap, GDP
growth, and nonfarm payrolls change, and one-standard deviation increases in the
unemployment gap and unemployment change. I consider changes of the opposite
sign for the “normal” regime. Table 20 indicates that although business cycle
responses are of a similar magnitude during the “normal” regime defined by each
threshold variable, the same is not true of responses during the “bad” regime.
Instead, the response is nearly 2.5 times larger when the change in nonfarm payrolls
is used as the threshold variable than when the change in the federal funds rate is
used.
Turning to results for the other variables, Table 19 and Figure 11 indicate
that fiscal policy mimics monetary policy during the “bad” regime but not during
the “normal” regime. During the “bad” regime fiscal policymakers implement
expansionary policy in the quarter following expansionary monetary policy. It is
possible that in doing so fiscal policymakers are responding directly to monetary
18In order to convert estimated coefficients into 2016q3 dollars I multiply each coefficient, which
measures the response of the cyclically-adjusted deficit as a percentage of potential GDP, by the
value of potential GDP in 2016q3.
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policy. However, another possibility is that fiscal and monetary policymakers have
similar ideas about how to respond to a weak economy but fiscal policymakers are
unable to respond as quickly as monetary policymakers.
Finally, for both threshold variables the coefficient on the “United
Government” variable is negative during the “bad” regime, suggesting that policy
responds less to a weak economy when Congress and the presidency are controlled
by the same party. It should be noted that this coefficient is estimated off of only
nine observations and appears to be driven primarily by 1980q3-q4; deleting these
observations results in an averaged coefficient very close to zero.19 The instability
of this estimate combined with the fact that the “United Government” variable
has a very low inclusion probability suggests that one should take care when
interpreting this coefficient.
5. Conclusion
In recent years regime-dependent fiscal multipliers have received a great deal
of attention in empirical research. Regime dependence in fiscal policy conduct has
received far less attention, although there is evidence to suggest that discretionary
policy responses vary according to the state of the business cycle and debt levels.
These findings rely on strong assumptions about the structure of the underlying
model, however; the variables and corresponding values that induce regime switches
are often imposed rather than estimated. I extend the existing literature by using
Bayesian model comparison techniques to compare linear and threshold models
that differ with respect to the included covariates and, for threshold models, the
threshold variable and value that initiate a regime switch. Posterior probabilities
19The cyclically-adjusted deficit actually increased in both 1980q3 and 1980q4 but its growth
was outpaced by the growth in potential GDP. Since the cyclically-adjusted deficit is expressed as
a percentage of potential GDP in all the models I consider its value fell.
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obtained from this process enable me to determine which model type (linear or
threshold), covariate combination, threshold variable, and threshold values are most
plausible. I consider twenty-nine possible threshold variables related to the business
cycle, debt, monetary policy, inflation, and political environment.
My results indicate that fiscal policy is regime dependent: the set of threshold
models is at least five times more probable than the set of linear models. Among
the different threshold variables, the change in nonfarm payrolls and the change
in the federal funds rate are the most likely drivers of regime change. Notably,
the sign of the output gap and the five debt variables that I consider have a very
low probability of determining regimes. Threshold value posteriors favor extreme
negative values when either the change in nonfarm payrolls or the change in the
federal funds rate are used as the threshold variable, splitting observations into
periods of “normal” and “bad” economic performance that roughly coincide with
recession dates. While there are a lot of similarities between the regimes defined by
either threshold variable, the number of “bad” episodes that occurred in the United
States between 1966 and 2016 is smaller using the change in nonfarm payrolls, but
the duration of each episode is longer. Finally, policy is strongly countercyclical
during the “bad” regime while at other times it is slightly countercyclical or
acyclical.
My findings suggest that discretionary fiscal policymakers, knowingly or
not, may benefit from the fact that large policy responses are limited primarily to
periods of weak economic activity when such policy is likely to be most effective. In
the future, it would be useful to explore this idea further by determining whether
the same variables that govern regime switching in policy conduct determine regime
switching in fiscal policy effectiveness. If not, fiscal policymakers may benefit from
modifying policy responses in a way that more closely corresponds to periods of
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high policy effectiveness. Although there is some overlap between the threshold
variables considered in this paper and a paper by Fazzari et al (2015) on regime-
dependent multipliers, they do not consider either the change in nonfarm payrolls
or the change in the federal funds rate, suggesting that this topic warrants further
research.
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